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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the performance of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI). The thesis attempts to 
reveal whether it is still possible to reach abnormal returns by employing an SRI strategy based on compa-
nies’ nonfinancial ESG aspects. Previous academic literature displays mixed and varies evidence but also 
the connection between high ESG scores and positive abnormal returns have been announced by various 
studies. The thesis is inspired by the recent working paper of Bansal, Wu, and Yaron (2018) in which 
authors reveal results supporting the possibility to achieve abnormal returns. Authors find that SRI yields 
excess returns in wealth dependent manner leading to a conclusion that high responsible stocks behave in 
a fashion akin to luxury goods. Accordingly, the thesis targets to clarify if the performance of SRI is time-
varying in a way suggested by Bansal et al. (2018). 
 
Utilizing ESG data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database, return data of S&P 500 firms from the 
Datastream database and factor data from Kenneth French data library this thesis evaluates the returns of 
SRI by applying the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. ASSET4 offers five annual ratings for all compa-
nies considering the Environmental, Social, Governance, Economical and Equally Weighted dimensions. 
Within each category, the top, bottom and long-short portfolio referred to as the top-minus-bottom portfolio 
is formed based on annual ratings of the companies. The portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each 
year based on the ratings from the previous year. Portfolios are constructed based on the 10 % cut-off rate. 
The monthly performance of the portfolios is evaluated over the sample period of 16 years from January 
2003 to December 2018.  
 
First, this thesis concludes that considering the whole sample period in question SRI generates significantly 
negative abnormal returns. The Equally Weighted top-minus-bottom portfolio yields a statistically signifi-
cant alpha of -0.55 % per month. Secondly, to investigate the time variability of the returns the thesis em-
ploys 36-month rolling regression. Additionally, the sample period is divided into three subperiods includ-
ing the times before, during and after the recession documented by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. The thesis concludes that the performance of SRI is high time-varying and finds that the negative 
returns of the whole sample are driven by the significant underperformance during the post-recession era. 
Similar wealth dependent preference shifts in line with the findings of Bansal et al (2018) are not detected. 
In contrast, the evidence suggests that SRI significantly underperforms during the economically good post-
recession era. Finally, the thesis examines the relationship between the performance of SRI and the con-
sumption of luxury goods. The luxury goods consumption is measured by the U.S. personal consumption 
expenditures on jewelry and watches. The thesis concludes that a robust positive correlation between the 
growth of PCE on jewelry and watches and the 36-month rolling alpha of the Socially Responsible Investing 
is not discovered, instead the evidence rather suggests a negative correlation. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS: Socially Responsible Investing, SRI, ESG, Luxury goods
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) that utilizes firms’ environmental, social and gov-
ernmental (ESG) actions in implementing investment decisions have received wide inter-
est among both financial practitioners and researches during recent years. The popularity 
of SRI has been rising because of several reasons that have affected increasingly in our 
daily life. People are nowadays willing to favor or refrain certain activities for a good 
cause that can be related to for example climate change, civil rights or military issues. 
The same trend concerns also many investors. Maybe the most influential recent devel-
opments and events that have accelerated the popularity of SRI have been the rising con-
cern on global warming, ethical consumerism and the recent effects of the financial crisis. 
Nowadays the traditional view of financial theory that a company’s only target is to max-
imize shareholder value is under severe critic. People are more aware of issues arising 
when a firm only targets shareholder wealth in its actions. Hence concentrating on ESG 
issues can offer a vital competitive advantage. 
 
Even though the attention on SRI has generally increased significantly it is still rather 
marginally investigated subject of research by academicians in the field of finance. Most 
of the studies that consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) are focusing on the cor-
porate level strategies that can be implemented and the outcomes that are possible to be 
achieved or missed by these different approaches. In the field of finance, research is fo-
cusing mostly on the effects of CSR and SRI on firms’ valuations and stock market per-
formance. Results regarding the subject are mixed and vary, on the other hand several 
papers find robust evidence supporting the perspective of “doing good while doing well” 
(Kempf and Osthoff 2007, Statman and Glushkov 2009 & Edmans 2011). On the con-
trary, numerous papers provide evidence declaring that making investment decisions 
based on firms’ environmental, social and governmental aspects leads to a portfolio that 
generates similar returns as conventional ones or even significantly negative alphas (Tip-
pet 2001; Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin 2005; Auer & Schuhmahcer 2016). Further, some 
academic papers reveal significant positive returns by investing in the least responsible 
companies. For example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that it is possible to con-
struct a significantly profitable portfolio by selecting only so-called “sin” companies that 
are known mainly by their questionable business activities. 
 
Additionally, as the evidence varies between studies that are investigating various mar-
kets during different sample periods, academic research on SRI focuses on the perfor-
mance factors that are impacting the returns during different periods. One of the most 
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famous subjects after the profitability issue has been the question that how stocks that are 
considered as good by ESG criteria are performing during market crisis. Papers regarding 
the problem often display findings suggesting the buffering effect of high ESG companies 
during these turbulent periods. In other words, the literature suggests that high ESG rated 
companies outperform the low ESG rated ones during crisis periods. This effect is often 
explained by the additional need of trust during the crisis. Consequently, high ESG rated 
companies manage to implement good policies in ordinary market conditions and the ex-
ecuted practices are likely to breed the trust of investors. In conclusion, when the reputa-
tion is good, the trust of stakeholders is high which leads to the steadier path through 
extremely volatile times. (Lins, Servaes & Tamayo 2017.) 
 
This thesis investigates the idea of wealth dependent preferences of SRI and how the 
popularity of SRI might fluctuate over time. The original idea is based on the working 
paper of Bansal, Wu & Yaron (2018). Specifically, Bansal et al. (2018) reason that during 
good economic times, households have greater financial wealth and can consequently af-
ford to be SRI-conscious. This drives up demand for high-SR stocks, resulting in higher 
realized alphas. By contrast, during bad times, households face more binding wealth con-
straints and therefore have to pull back on their “social consciousness” and revert to con-
sumptions of more subsistence-like products. This reduces the demand for high-SR 
stocks, thereby decreasing and even reversing the alpha spreads between high- and low-
SR stocks. The displayed process leads to a scenario where the performance of SRI is 
significantly time-varying along the business cycle. (Bansal et al. 2018.) 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the thesis and hypotheses 
 
The expanding growth of SRI validates the subject of the thesis and it is important to 
investigate further the nature of the SRI performance. The objective of this thesis is to 
find further evidence to clarify the issues presented in this chapter above, by the empirical 
evaluation that is implemented in a relatively novel manner. First, the thesis studies the 
overall performance of SRI portfolios constructed for the purpose. After the general per-
formance evaluation, the thesis aims to provide evidence to determine if the performance 
of SRI is significantly time-varying and examines the SRI returns in different economic 
conditions. Additionally, the thesis compares the time variability of the derived SRI re-
turns to the consumption of luxury goods in a similar manner as Bansal, Wu & Yaron 
(2018). The luxury goods are determined here as premium-priced products offering au-
thentic value, high-quality and prestigious image (Ko, Costello & Taylor 2017). This 
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thesis uses the consumption of jewelry and watches to detect possible relation between 
luxury products and SRI.    
 
The idea behind this approach is the possibility that SRI funds can be seen as the luxury 
good of investments, as it can be that investors are preferring high ESG stocks and funds 
during good economic times when they can afford them. The consumption of luxury 
goods is high during economically good times simply because people have more money 
to be spent on unnecessities. Similarly, when the times are good investors can give more 
weight to different aspects of investments besides only the returns. In other words, inves-
tors are investing in high ESG stocks because the performance is not as crucial when the 
times are good. The idea relates to the general theory of corporate social responsibility 
stating that investing in responsibility means lowering the shareholder wealth as these 
actions are not executed directly to improve profits. Investors are maybe doing good while 
doing well or just giving money to charity, both options are at least half-decent during 
good times. 
 
In line with the general idea the thesis studies four hypotheses listed below: 
 
H1: SRI portfolio generates significant positive alpha 
 
H2: The alpha of SRI portfolio is time-varying 
 
H3: The SRI alpha is significantly positive only during good economic periods 
 
H4: The SRI alpha correlates with luxury goods consumption 
 
By examining the presented hypotheses, the thesis aims to offer several contributions to 
the existing literature. First, as the findings of Bansal et al. (2018) are novel it is important 
to re-examine the issue further and possibly to provide additional evidence as the findings 
have not been yet scientifically replicated. This thesis also utilizes more recent data to 
provide timely evidence and a new set of data by employing the ESG ratings from the 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. Despite the nature of the findings, this thesis will 
contribute to the previous research by adding evidence to clarify the possible time varia-
bility, wealth dependence and luxury-good-like behavior of SRI. From a practical point 
of view if the performance of SRI is varying in wealth dependent manner it should offer 
investors and fund managers important insights to their decision-making process. If the 
time variability exists and may be predicted the practical usefulness will be pronounced. 
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1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following way: the second chapter introduces the 
general background for the topic, including a brief analysis of the development of SRI, 
the most popular strategies used in the field of SR investing and the motives behind SR 
investors. Additionally, the concept of luxury goods is explained and similarities between 
SR investing and luxury goods consumption are discussed. Finally, the second chapter 
introduces how the thesis defines economic good and bad times. The third section of the 
thesis provides in-depth analysis of the previous literature considering SRI. The previous 
research is divided into three groups: the papers considering the overall performance of 
SRI, the studies investigating the effect of SRI during crisis and the papers finding evi-
dence to support the wealth dependent alternative. The fourth chapter presents the neces-
sary theoretical background of the thesis before the fifth section, in which the data and 
methods utilized in the empirical part are introduced.  
 
Section five offers and discusses the empirical results displayed by the examination. The 
chapter is divided into three subchapters based on the hypotheses testing. First subchapter 
considers the overall performance of SRI, second the time variability and wealth depend-
ence, last subchapter explores the relation between SRI and luxury goods. Finally, the 
seventh section concludes the thesis by restating the purpose, discussing the findings and 
mentioning the limitations of the study.      
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2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
This section of the thesis briefly introduces the main background information in relation 
to the subject of the thesis. First, the section below presents the socially responsible in-
vesting and the related concepts, development of SRI, SRI strategies and different moti-
vations driving SR investors. Secondly, the section introduces generally how luxury 
goods are usually defined, how the consumption of luxury goods fluctuates over time and 
why the concept of luxury is used in the thesis. Thirdly, the section defines how the thesis 
considers good and bad economic times. The chapter also offers a discussion identifying 
the possible links between the general concepts of the thesis. 
 
 
2.1. Socially Responsible Investing 
 
Socially responsible investing refers to an investment strategy where an investor utilizes 
the company’s non-financial concerns for example corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities and ethicality through certain criteria, to make a decision to invest or not to 
invest in a company (Sandberg, Juravle, Hedesström & Hamilton 2009). The terms in the 
scheme of SRI may appear confusing since social responsibility can be viewed from sev-
eral different perspectives which all have their own definitions. Common definitions used 
as interchangeably for SRI depending on from which standpoint investor approaches the 
field and how the topic is defined includes for example the terms sustainable investing, 
responsible investing, ethical investing, social investing, socially aware investing, green 
investing, value-based investing and mission-related investing. However, during recent 
years the term SRI has established its position as the one consistent abbreviation used for 
the investment strategies that exploit at least one of the following aspects: environmental, 
social or governance (ESG) dimensions. (Sandberg et al. 2009; von Wallis & Klein 2015.) 
 
Sandberg et al. (2009) who examine the heterogeneity on the field of SRI concludes that 
there may be some agreement at the definitional level but there are radical differences on 
three other levels, which they determine as the terminological-, strategic- and practical-
levels. According to the paper, these differences originate to the differences of cultures, 
regions, and countries where actors have embraced different values, norms, and ideolo-
gies. In addition, authors clarify that cultural differences have occurred maybe because 
under the same definition different styles have emerged in different parts of the world 
almost at the same time. Secondly, they explain that heterogeneity can be due to the fact 
that actors and stakeholders merely possess incoherent values and norms, leading to a 
16 
 
situation where different participants highlight different aspects resulting in heterogeneity 
of the field. Finally, one interesting possibility behind the fragmentation can simply be 
the fact of the commercial needs of various competitive actors, the linguistic labels of 
products can be an important part of a strategy to attract investors and stand out in a 
crowd. (Sandberg et al. 2009.) 
 
Although SRI as the universal abbreviation has its established position, the field is still 
very heterogeneous and has many undefined aspects, as mentioned above. Sandberg et al. 
(2009) also discuss the alternative of standardized field but admit that referring the facts 
it is unlikely that the SRI industry can be homogenous in a terminological and practical 
way. As one SRI director from the interview of Sandberg et al. (2009) noted: “SRI is 
whatever the client wants it to be”. Similarly, Dorfleitner & Utz (2012) conclude that 
sustainability depends heavily on individual preferences and basically any non-financial 
aspect of an investment can be included under the term sustainability. Because of the 
heterogeneity, it is hard to see how the field can be standardized as people from different 
cultures have such a huge difference with their norms and values driving their SRI actions. 
Dorfleitner & Utz (2012) do not see the need for a plain definition but for example, Sand-
berg et al. (2009) mention that to some extent the homogenization might be desirable for 
example to ease the academic research.  
 
Regardless of the heterogeneity, nowadays many academicians and organizations define 
SRI based on ESG evaluation: 
 
“SRI is an investment process that integrates social, environmental, and ethical considerations 
into investment decision making” (Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang 2008a). 
 
“SRI is an investment discipline that considers environmental, social and corporate governance 
(ESG) criteria to generate long-term competitive financial returns and positive societal impact” 
(USSIF 2019). 
 
Consequently, the most commonly used definition of SRI is based on ESG and the most 
commonly used practices to implement SRI include evaluation of ESG criteria. The ESG 
screening methods vary among participants but the general aspects under the evaluation 
are rather similar. For example, MSCI (2019) reports that their ESG rating method in-
cludes several sub-criteria through which the company’s overall ESG score is derived. 
MSCI’s (2019) guideline represent rather universal process and Figure 1 below displays 
the general aspects of their environmental, social and governance evaluation. 
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Figure 1. The main aspects of ESG evaluation (MSCI 2019). 
 
 
More specifically all of these sub-categories are divided into different measurable aspects 
to rate the firm in question. For example, climate change includes carbon emissions and 
product carbon footprint, pollution & waste considers toxic emissions and package mate-
rials, and environmental opportunities to evaluate investments in cleantech. Instead, prod-
uct liability holds social aspects such as product safety, quality, privacy, and data security. 
Additionally, corporate governance and behavior facets observe for example board diver-
sity, executive salaries, tax transparency, and business ethics. (MSCI 2019.) 
 
As explained above the heterogeneity of the SRI movement is obvious, therefore this 
thesis uses the term SRI as the abbreviation is most widely known, the investment deci-
sion process which includes evaluation of ESG factors. For the ESG evaluation, the thesis 
uses a similar classification as MSCI (2019). The section of data & methods presents the 
ESG scoring process behind the utilized ESG ratings in more detail. In the data & methods 
section also the SRI strategy used for the portfolio construction is presented. In general, 
different SRI implementation strategies are presented in sub-section 2.1.2. 
 
Environmental 
Climate change 
Natural resources 
Pollution & Waste 
Environmental opportunities 
 
Governance 
Corporate governance 
Corporate behavior 
Social 
Human Capital 
Product liability 
Stakeholder opposition 
Social opportunities 
 
ESG 
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2.1.1. Corporate Social Responsibility as the foundation of SRI 
 
In addition to the terms used as synonyms for SRI, the field involves plenty of other terms 
and concepts. First, corporate social responsibility that contains firms’ ethical and respon-
sible behavior and strategic decisions mainly on ESG matters. By implementing different 
CSR policies, companies offer a basis for a modern SR investor to evaluate different op-
tions, often via ESG criteria. The evaluation of strategic CSR choices has been also under 
intense investigation for decades, but the field concentrates mostly on the corporate fi-
nance view. Therefore, the research regarding CSR usually evaluates the relation between 
corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP), and the 
cash flow changes which might be achieved by increasing CSR activities. (von Wallis & 
Klein 2015.)  
 
The European Commission (2019) defines CSR as the responsibility of companies for 
their impact on society, hence CSR should be led by companies and regulation plays only 
a supportive role. According to the European Commission, actions to become a socially 
responsible company includes integrating social, environmental, ethical, consumer, and 
human rights concerns into business strategies. Barnett (2007) distinguish CSR activities 
from other corporate’s investments by stating that CSR targets for increasing social wel-
fare instead of shareholders’ wealth. Hence, CSR takes into account also other stakehold-
ers in addition to owners. In summary, by investing in CSR activities firms are ignoring 
the wealth maximizing as their only responsibility. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility is a highly controversial concept and has its critiques. 
One party argues that CSR is a highly important part of a company’s everyday actions 
generating positive value and increasing profitability for example based on improved ac-
cess to financing (Moskowitz 1972; Waddock and Graves 1997). Additionally, Porter and 
Kramer (2006) state that appropriate CSR implementation offer opportunities and com-
petitive advantage, and further the modern stakeholder theory claims that responsible ac-
tions toward a wide group of stakeholders result in improved CFP (Freeman 1984; Don-
aldson & Preston 1995). On the contrary, the opposite view is that a company’s only 
responsibility is to create value for shareholders and creating value for other stakeholders 
via CSR actions only induce additional costs for “social good” (Friedman 1970; Vance 
1975). CSR initiatives may also increase agency costs as managers pursue personal aims 
to build their better reputation at the expense of shareholders (Barnea & Rubin 2010). 
The conflict is obvious and both views have their own reasonings. Furthermore, several 
academic papers are debating whether CSR improves or reduces a company’s financial 
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performance. Overall, to some extent, the relation between CSP and CFP is still an open 
question. 
 
This thesis centralizes its focus purely on SRI and the value that responsible stocks might 
offer to investors. The examination of the thesis is executed by comparing ESG matters 
relative to stock performance and the effects of corporate social responsibility are not 
directly investigated. This thesis offers only indirect evidence for the CSR based research 
as the ESG ratings are derived based on firms’ CSR actions. 
 
2.1.2. Development of SRI 
 
The beginning of SRI bases on hundreds of years of old religious education and ideology 
that had a major impact on the behavior of individuals at the time. More precisely the 
origin dates back to the early biblical times when Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions 
guided people on how to use and invest money in an ethical and equitable manner. Ini-
tially, religious investors were practicing SRI by investing in mainly nonviolent firms that 
did not participate in slave trade nor produced products designed to kill. These methods 
can be viewed as the first SRI “screens” for investing and were implemented for example 
by early Quaker immigrants in the U.S. already in the 1700s. One similar negative screen-
ing method which gained popularity in the wake of first SRI screens was so-called “sin 
screens”. At the time avoiding sin stocks was one of the most used screens and usually 
sinful companies were classified as firms from alcohol, tobacco, weapon, and gambling 
industries. (Schueth 2003; Renneboog et al. 2008a.) 
 
Currently evolving, more modern, SRI is based on an individual’s convictions and has its 
roots in the 1960s when several themes regarding corporate social responsibility offered 
a propitious premise for socially conscious investors. The most current concerns at the 
time ranged from the Vietnam war to civil rights and gender equality, also cold war had 
an effect. Through the 1970s and 1980s the popularity of SRI grew dramatically embrac-
ing new factors such as labor issues and nuclear resistance. The major international issue 
during the era that received wide attention among SR investors was the racist apartheid 
of South Africa. Since then much has happened. First, incidents such as Chernobyl and 
Exxon Valdez and profound new information on global warming shifted SRI strongly 
towards green thinking. Even more recently school killings, human rights issues and eth-
ical consumerism around the world have had a great impact alongside financial crisis 
again towards more balanced ESG evaluation. At the same time increasing concerns 
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regarding the environment have been on the carpet all the time. (Schueth 2003; 
Renneboog et al. 2008a.)  
 
Today the SRI industry is bigger than ever before and there is no end in sight for the 
growth. During the growth, also several institutions and alliances have been founded to 
foresee and promote the industry, Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) and 
Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) both being good examples. Both are influen-
tial actors in the field and encourage firms and investors to pay attention to ESG issues. 
GSIA is a collaboration of membership-based sustainable investment organizations in-
cluding members worldwide, for example the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment of United States (USSIF), the European Sustainable Investment Forum (Eu-
rosif), and the Japan Sustainable Investment Forum (JSIF). All these members of the al-
liance are leading associations in their own continent for the promotion and advancement 
of SRI. Instead, PRI is the world’s leading independent proponent of responsible invest-
ing supported by the United Nations. It operates on the behalf of its signatories to develop 
the field of responsible investing and to create a more sustainable global financial system. 
To achieve these objectives the six principles of PRI have been created to guide the sig-
natories. These principles are listed below. (GSIA 2019; PRI 2019.) 
 
▪ Principle 1: We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-mak-
ing processes. 
▪ Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership 
policies and practices. 
▪ Principle 3: We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which 
we invest. 
▪ Principle 4: We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the 
investment industry. 
▪ Principle 5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Prin-
ciples. 
▪ Principle 6: We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the 
Principles.  
 
As mentioned above the popularity of socially responsible investing has been growing 
substantially during the recent years, for example the assets under management (AUM) 
by signatories of PRI have increased steadily in a remarkable way since its establishment 
in 2006. Figure 2 below shows the PRI related data, including the amount of PRI signa-
tories and the worldwide AUM of the signatories. (PRI 2019.)  
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Figure 2. The growth of PRI (PRI 2019). 
 
 
As the figure displays the assets under management of the signatories were approximately 
86 trillion U.S. dollars at the end of 2019, the average growth rate of the AUM being 17 
% per year during the past ten-year period (PRI 2019). At the same time, USSIF (2019) 
reports that in the United States at the beginning of 2018 more than one out of every four 
professionally managed dollars was invested via SRI strategies, which equals approxi-
mately 26% of total 46,6 trillion dollars. Further, the industry of professional SR investing 
enjoyed a growth of more than 38 percent from the year 2016 to 2018, from AUM of $8,7 
trillion to $12 trillion. Based on the data it is safe to say that SRI has become a mainstream 
investment strategy in recent years. (USSIF 2019.) 
 
As the popularity of SRI is growing massively it also underlines the relevance of the 
subject and validates the importance of this thesis. 
 
2.1.3. SRI strategies 
 
In general, socially responsible investors have the same main aim as conventional inves-
tors, which is making money. Additionally, SR investors are interested in making a dif-
ference while making the money and based on the previous literature sometimes these 
objectives can be in conflict. To achieve these objectives, SR investors have the same 
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asset classes available as conventional investors. This thesis concentrates on stocks and 
therefore equity is the only asset class considered. SRI regarding fixed income products 
and alternative investments are beyond the scope of this study. As conventional investors, 
SR investors also have numerous or even unlimited possibilities to construct a portfolio 
for the desired purpose. Frequently screening, shareholder advocacy, and community in-
vesting approaches are mentioned as the three most popular strategies in academic liter-
ature. (Schueth 2003; von Wallis & Klein 2015.) 
 
Screening can be viewed as the most common strategy and can be defined as a practice 
of including or excluding certain companies based on their CSR activities on ESG mat-
ters. First, a portfolio can be constructed with negative screens, which means narrowing 
the investment universe by industries or companies who practice harmful business activ-
ities or are just not able to reach a certain level of ESG rating. The most traditional and 
primitive screening was based on negative screens avoiding “sin industries” including 
military weapons, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and nuclear power. Nowadays, negative 
screening is more commonly based on avoiding firms that do not meet investors’ ESG 
related minimum standards. Usually, the evaluation is based on environmental, social, 
ethical and administrative aspects, including for example product quality, environmental 
record, political donations, cultural diversity, and consumer relations. In general, compa-
nies implementing shady practices in a certain area or doing sinful business are screened 
out from the portfolio. Of course, negative screening methods vary greatly between prac-
titioners because of personal values and beliefs. For example, for some people gambling 
is harmless enjoyment and for others a denied sin that might lead to an addiction. (Schueth 
2003; von Wallis & Klein 2015.)  
 
Another possibility is the positive screening performed by investing in companies that at 
least fulfill or even exceed specific ESG standards settled by regulators or required by 
investors. Positives screens can be exploited in different ways and probably the most pop-
ular methods are regular positive screening and the best in class method. Regular positive 
screening considers the whole investment universe equally. Such screening can lead to a 
situation in which the portfolio is unbalanced and badly diversified for instance between 
industries. For example, the petroleum industry may be screened out from the portfolio 
because of the environmental aspect even if some oil companies might act in a highly 
responsible manner relative to its peers. Because of the above-mentioned risk many in-
vestors prefer the best in class method, in which the screening is executed by choosing 
the top-rated firms in each sector separately. Preferring the method, the final portfolio 
consists of much prudent diversification but usually is not as desirable when evaluating 
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it purely by ESG factors. Today SR investors also utilize so-called two-stage approaches 
where a portfolio is constructed by starting with the negative screening to narrow poten-
tial companies and then making the final decisions based on positive screens. (Schueth 
2003; von Wallis & Klein 2015.) 
 
Shareholder advocacy is a more challenging way of doing SRI, it is described as a method 
where an investor takes an active role to change the operations of a firm. Advocacy efforts 
usually include engaging in dialogue with companies and managers on issues and prob-
lems that could be managed in a more responsible manner. Besides, shareholder activists 
usually propose different improvements and are also prepared to use their voting rights. 
The main target is to improve the CSP and CFP of the firm. Finally, the community in-
vesting is an option aiming to provide a better premise to people in unfortunate and poor 
communities. The main goal is to enable capital flows to communities who cannot raise 
these funds through conventional channels. For example, low income housing and small 
business financing in disadvantaged communities are often achieved by community in-
vesting. Often community investors are more willing to sacrifice higher returns for good 
cause than other investors. (Schueth 2003; von Wallis & Klein 2015.)  
 
In this thesis the screening methods are mostly discussed as these methods are the most 
used and also the most accessible way of doing SRI for investors. For the empirical re-
search this thesis uses a screening method explained in the data & methods section for 
the portfolio construction.  
 
2.1.4. Motives behind SRI 
 
This section presents different motives behind the investment decisions of SR investors 
based on previous research. Motives are important as the subject of the thesis is closely 
related to the idea that investors may give up their socially responsible preferences when 
times are bad and can afford responsible thinking only during good times. If investors 
consider SRI as a luxurious investment decision the motives behind it should be diverse 
and not only performance driven.  
 
Traditionally investment decisions should be based only on risk and return. According to 
Markowiz (1952) every investor is maximizing the return at a certain level of risk which 
represents their risk aversion. With socially responsible investing the case might be dif-
ferent as individual investors have different preferences regarding SRI. For example, 
Pasewark and Riley (2010) state that investor’s personal values are taken into account in 
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decision making, and that the general motivations of socially responsible investor are a 
desire to achieve return, a desire to affect social change and a desire for personal satisfac-
tion. Furthermore, for example Schueth (2003) notes that two kinds of SR investors exist: 
the first, so-called “feel good” investors, have an internal need to invest in a manner that 
is close with their personal values. The second type wants to be a part in a process acting 
towards a better future for society as a whole. Concluded, others want to feel good while 
others have a desire to do good. These different non risk-return related motivations drive 
the decision-making process of SR investor.  
 
In addition to the fact that individual investors have different preferences, the motivation 
behind implementing SRI varies also between different market participants. Money man-
agers mostly raise the client demand as their top motivation whereas for example institu-
tions note fulfilling a mission and pursuing social benefits as their main objective. Com-
mon motivation for SR investors seems to be the intention to reach solid financial perfor-
mance while investing in a way that is likely to provide non-financial benefits. Some 
market participants even believe that ESG incorporation is a vital way of doing risk man-
agement leading to a better long-term performance. (USSIF 2018; PRI 2019.) 
 
As USSIF (2018) reports money managers and institutions at least do not mention the 
performance as the main target when implementing SRI and individuals’ main aim is to 
support their personal values and goals. Motivation behind SRI is hence at least partially 
unrelated to the performance. The evidence of some papers even suggest that SR investors 
are consciously willing to sacrifice better performance for ESG matters. For example, 
Sparkes (1998) states that more than every third investor would invest ethically, even if 
returns were lower than conventional gains. Similarly, Lewis and Mackenzie (1999) find 
that almost 95% of socially responsible investors would not change their SR investments 
for higher performing conventional options.  
 
Furthermore, Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) find that SR investor’s main motivation is to 
avoid harmful companies but also the aim to support companies that make a positive 
change for society. The evidence of the paper again supports the hypothesis that the mo-
tives of SR investors are not purely performance driven. The questionnaire-style research 
of Lewis and Mackenzie (2000) shows evidence that 42 % of ethical investors are even 
expecting lower returns from their SR investments than from conventional ones. In con-
clusion, the paper suggests that several ethical investors are expecting costs from imple-
menting SRI. Also, Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2011) find that SR investors are 
less concerned about negative returns than investors of conventional funds. 
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Because individual SR investors are aiming for the good cause and responsibility, it also 
leads to the possibility that SRI fund managers may not pursue the highest risk-adjusted 
returns as their second incentive is to provide socially responsible ways to make money 
(Renneboog et al. 2008a). In general, if SRI underperforms conventional investments it 
might be that Friedmans (1970) critique is right and investors should invest in conven-
tional high performing funds and seek to make a positive change by donating. 
 
The motivations found by academic research are mostly non-performance driven. As 
these motivations have not been studied during different economical market conditions it 
can be that SRI is like donating for many SR investors as they are willing to sacrifice a 
reasonable investor action for a good feeling. If we think about the relation to luxury 
goods, we can consider that when individuals are buying luxurious products, he or she is 
similarly making a decision based on personal feelings. On the contrary, the idea of this 
thesis supposes that possible SR investors shift their preferences when times are bad, thus 
indicating that SR investors are performance driven. The possible explanation is that SR 
investors are performance driven when times are not economically good but shift their 
preferences towards non-performance related features when the aggregate wealth is high. 
It is possible that during good times when the primitive need of decent returns is easily 
reached the responsibility aspects emerge. Similarly, during good times consumers can 
easily afford high standard of living and the consumption of luxury goods increase. 
 
 
2.2. Luxury goods and the reasoning of using them  
 
In addition to the SRI it is important to briefly explain the general background information 
about luxury goods since the research of the thesis is partially related to the consumption 
of luxury goods and this unnecessity consumption forms a foundation to the main idea of 
the thesis.  
 
2.2.1. Definition of luxury goods 
 
As defining SRI, also the definition of luxury goods is not unambiguous. There are several 
challenges in defining luxury, not least the fact that it is a relative concept. For example, 
someone’s luxury might be self-evident to another and additionally the concept of luxury 
has definitely fluctuated over time. For example, Heine (2012) defines that fundamentally 
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luxury is something that is more than necessary. More accurate defining can be comple-
mented from that foundation.  
 
When searching more precise definition, luxury goods can be defined for example based 
on consumer perceptions, product attributes, and managerially determined dimensions.  
Usually in the previous literature definition of luxury includes at least dimensions such 
as high-quality, rarity, exclusivity, premium pricing and high level of aesthetics. Further-
more, luxurious goods often offer a high level of symbolic value and are desired by con-
sumers, for example to display their individual uniqueness and status. What forms the 
position of luxurious brands and products is at the end the consumer behavior. Certain 
managerial decisions and strategies such as premium pricing or pursuing superior quality 
can increase the likelihood of being categorized into the luxury segment. Nonetheless, 
these actions or any strategy are not the unmistakable paths to the luxury status because 
in the end, all depends on consumers’ approval. Often luxury brands are related to prod-
ucts such as perfumes, jewelry, watches, leather goods, shoes, cars, wine, champagne, 
tableware, and porcelain. (Dubois & Duquesne 1993; Tynan, McKechnie & Chhuon 
2010; Ko, Costello & Taylor 2017.) 
 
In addition, Ko et al. (2017) propose a more specific theoretical definition that is based 
on five key elements that create a luxurious brand. The specification of Ko et al. (2017) 
is rather universal and similar to other previous literature for example with Heine (2012). 
Definition of Ko et al. (2017) first mention the high-quality. Second, authentic value by 
offering desired functional or emotional benefits. Third, a prestigious image via qualities 
such as artisanship, craftmanship or service quality. Fourth, justified premium pricing and 
last, deep connection or resonance with the consumer. In general, luxury brands offer 
products or services that consumers perceive to fulfill these five above mentioned aspects. 
(Ko et al. 2017.) 
 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to compare the similarities between luxury goods and 
socially responsible investing. When comparing the definition of luxury goods to SRI 
some similarities can be found. Based on previous research investing in high SR-rated 
stocks gives emotional and personal benefits for a group of investors (Schueth 2003; 
Pasewark & Riley 2012). Also, previous studies show that a group of SR investors ap-
prove the possible premium pricing or lower returns of “good” stocks to have the benefits 
of implementing SRI (Sparkes 1998; Lewis & Mackenzie 1999). As explained above also 
consumers of luxury goods accept premium pricing while seeking individual benefits. In 
other words, similarities between SR investors and luxury consumers may be detected. In 
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this thesis the personal consumption expenditures on jewelry and watches are used for 
the empirical purpose to reflect the overall luxury goods consumption. 
 
2.2.2. The behavior of luxury goods consumption 
 
It is obvious that luxury goods consumption declines during economic downturns as 
spending in general to nonessential offerings decrease during such periods. Common con-
sumer theory states that the demand of luxuries should be more cyclical through economic 
cycle than the demand of necessities. Some economists even define luxury goods as goods 
for which the demand rises proportionally more than income when income increases 
(Tynan et al. 2010). In other words, the income elasticity of demand is equal to or greater 
than one for luxury goods. Basically, people are willing to spend more on these unneces-
sities when the level of wealth exceeds the long-run needs and economic conditions are 
favorable. Conversely, when the current level of wealth falls short, from the long-run-
required level, consumers generally start saving by first holding down the money spent 
on luxuries. Hence, as luxurious purchases are easier to postpone, luxury goods consump-
tion usually goes through a harder path during recessions than other goods. This is why 
the luxury goods consumption is seen as one of the indicators of economic conditions. 
(Bils & Klenow 1998; Ikeda 2006; Reyneke, Sorokáčová & Pitt 2012.) 
 
The idea to use luxury goods in this thesis to study the behavior of SRI returns is based 
on an idea of Bansal et al. (2018). In their paper, Bansal et al. (2018) argue that investors 
view SRI as a luxury good and making an investment on high ESG rated companies is a 
discretionary decision. They claim that preference for investing in “good” stocks is time-
varying and dependent on aggregate wealth, similarly like the demand for luxury goods 
is procyclical with the economic cycle. Bansal et al. (2018) reason that during periods 
when aggregate wealth is at high level households can afford to be SRI-conscious. Thus, 
during good times they are willing to deviate from the full-universe mean-variance fron-
tier to the portfolios including high-SR stocks. Authors’ theory leads to higher abnormal 
returns of these high rated stocks during good times as households can afford to drive up 
the demand of these stocks. When the economic environment is not as beneficial investors 
are forced to restrain their discretionary desires to reach their essential needs. As Bansal 
et al. (2018) state, investors shift their portfolios back towards the full mean-variance 
frontier, which drives down the demand of SR funds and leads to lower alphas during 
economically bad times. Similarly, consumer theory states that during economically chal-
lenging times households restrain their spending on luxuries to maintain their purchasing 
power toward necessities. 
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Based on the idea the returns of SR based investing should be highly cyclical over time, 
as the consumption of luxury goods. If SRI is the luxury good of investors, SR based 
investing should thrive during good economic times, similar to sales of luxury goods is 
booming during times of high level of wealth. 
 
2.2.3. Motives behind luxury goods consumption 
 
There are a variety of proposed reasons why individuals consume luxury products. Maybe 
one of the most recognized reasons is the individual needs to declare wealth and status by 
consuming in a visible manner to luxury products. Another essential motive behind lux-
ury consumption is social comparison. People use luxury goods to conform to social 
standards or to reach their aspirations of who they are and hope to be. Consumers may 
also seek out luxurious products to enhance their self-concept in various ways. For exam-
ple, consumers with an interdependent self-concept are more likely to consume on main-
stream luxury goods to feel good about themselves and to be identified as a member of a 
reference group. While an independent self-concept encourages to buy luxury goods to 
differentiate from others.  The need for originality can be easily satisfied due to high 
prices, rarity and restricted distributions of luxury products. Even though the individual 
reason can be almost opposite, whether to buy for originality or group affiliation, the basic 
need for both is to enhance the self-concept.  (Dubois & Duoquesne 1993; Ko et al. 2017.) 
 
In summary, external and internal motives drive the decision to buy luxury products. 
Some consumers want to declare their identity and position by luxury brands while others 
pursue inner satisfaction, uniqueness, and pleasure. In some way, consumers desire to buy 
luxury products and investors need for SR-funds springs from similar personal aspira-
tions. Based on previous literature investors are not usually declaring their responsibility 
by investing in high ESG rated funds but more likely a group of “feel good” investors are 
buying these stocks to get inner satisfaction by doing good (Schueth 2003; Pasewark & 
Riley 2010). In brief, there is some evidence that even the motivations behind buying 
luxury goods and investing in SR stocks have similarities. 
 
 
2.3. Economically good and bad times 
 
This thesis also examines the time variability of SRI returns to detect if the wealth de-
pendent preference shifts detected by the paper of Bansal et al. (2018) can be confirmed. 
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For the purpose, this thesis employs information from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) that offers the U.S. business cycle data regarding the dates of expan-
sions and contractions. To conduct the analysis this thesis defines economic good times 
as the expansion periods offered by the NBER. The economic bad times are defined by 
the NBER recession periods starting from the peak of a business cycle and ending at the 
trough of the cycle. The recessions are determined as significant declines in economic 
activity spreading across the economy and lasting longer than a few months, normally 
visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail 
sales. (NBER 2020.) 
 
Based on the presented information of the second section, the thesis concludes that it is 
safe to say that SRI has experienced phenomenal growth around the world over the past 
decades to become a mainstream investment strategy. This thesis also assumes that the 
growth has not reached its peak yet and SRI is not going to vanish like a momentary trend. 
Instead, it is likely that investors will value ESG aspects even more in the future and the 
growth of SRI will proceed. Even if the human race can manage to improve on, or some-
how repair the existing issues it is probable that new issues will occur. As social respon-
sibility is an important and rising factor in finance and investing, it is vital to enhance the 
research of the field. This thesis will contribute to the field by examining one of the less 
researched parts that seek to explain the motives behind SR investors. If there are a link 
and strong similarities between luxury goods and SRI or if SRI investing is time-varying 
in a way that most profits by the strategy are gained during economically good times it 
might signify that SRI is something that investors can only afford during good times.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section discusses the previous literature regarding the general profitability of SRI 
investing. The literature review introduces three alternative hypotheses regarding the per-
formance which all have gained academic support: “doing good but not well”, “doing 
good while doing well” and “no effect”. Also, different possibilities to implement the 
research are presented in the process e.g. with stocks, mutual funds, and SRI-indices. On 
top of that previous literature on the buffering effect of SRI during the crisis is presented 
as it is one of the most closely related topics to the thesis. Finally, the paper by Bansal et 
al. (2018) and the literature supporting the wealth dependent possibility is discussed in 
depth.  
 
 
3.1. Profitability of SRI  
 
During recent years, SRI has established its position as an intriguing investment oppor-
tunity among practitioners. Naturally, at the same time, academic interest on the topic has 
emerged and nowadays academic literature regarding SRI is rather extended. While there 
are plenty of papers aiming to clarify the definition and boundaries of SRI as presented 
in the previous section, there are also many studies targeting to explain the financial per-
formance of SRI. This thesis is in line with the performance driven research and adds 
contribution to the existing literature to understand the profitability of SRI. Previous lit-
erature on SRI has displayed three alternative possibilities of how social responsibility 
can influence the performance of funds. These alternatives are presented below.  
 
First, the hypothesis of underperformance as known as the theory of “doing good but not 
well” which states that increased efforts on CSR entail costs to shareholders leading to 
negative abnormal returns (Statman & Glushkov 2009). From a different point of view, 
the theory suggests that SR investors are narrowing their options to invest by taking social 
responsibility into account. The restrictions of the investment universe necessarily lead 
to a situation in which otherwise profitable companies are foregone, the diversification is 
limited and eventually, the risk is increased (Revelli & Viviani 2015). At the same time 
because of the restrictions SR investors might drive the value of high SR companies up 
which results in lower expected returns (Hamilton, Jo & Statman1993). Supportive evi-
dence for the underperformance theory has been stated in various academic publications 
(Rudd 1981; Kahn, Lekander & Leimkuhler 1997; Renneboog 2008b; Trinks & Scholtens 
2017). 
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The second theory is “doing good while doing well” stating that high ESG rated stocks 
yield higher risk-adjusted returns than comparable conventional investments. The reason-
ing behind the over performance theory is that corporate’s elevated CSR policies can 
result in benefits that are underestimated by investors and managers (Statman & Glushkov 
2009). Similarly, Hamilton et al. (1993) suggest that consistent underestimation by inves-
tors to intangible assets gained by high-quality CSR policies is the reason why the case 
of “doing good while doing well” is possible. In practice, highly responsible firms are 
less prone to costly crises such as stakeholder relation scandals, environmental disasters 
or otherwise disadvantageous media attention (Hamilton et al. 1993; Statman & Glushkov 
2009).  Additionally, Chan & Walter (2014) state that poor social responsibility may de-
stroy long term firm value due to reputational losses or litigation costs. Furthermore, 
Sauer (1997) suggests that socially responsible firms may outperform their less responsi-
ble peers by building up to a higher level of loyalty with their customers, vendors, and 
employees. Also, the overperformance theory is identified by various academic propo-
nents (Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Koedjik 2005; Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Edmans 
2011). 
 
The final option is the “no effect” hypothesis stating that expected returns are not signif-
icantly different between the socially responsible stocks and conventional ones. Empirical 
evidence supporting the hypothesis can be found for example in the papers of Auer & 
Schuhmacher (2016), Statman (2000) and Sauer (1997). In theory, the “no effect” should 
be the case if social responsibility is not priced in stock markets, as non-risk related fac-
tors should be according to the theoretical framework of finance. Furthermore, the hy-
pothesis might be correct if the actions to increase social responsibility are exactly equally 
costly as the benefits that spring from the improvements on the ESG aspect. For example, 
a raise in employee salaries presumably increases employee satisfaction which might re-
sult in a situation where productivity is advanced, but employee costs are equally in-
creased. (Hamilton et al. 1993; Statman & Glushkov 2009)  
 
Clearly, the question regarding the performance of SRI is an intriguing issue that is still 
open for future academic research. The previous literature shows mixed and vary results 
regarding the performance in different fields of SRI. Plenty of research exists and every 
hypothesis has their own proponents as mentioned above. Below the thesis presents a 
more detailed analysis of some of the most important papers regarding the financial per-
formance of socially responsible investing.  
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One of the earliest papers to support the underperformance hypothesis is the paper by 
Rudd (1981). In his paper Rudd examines SRI in connection with the classical portfolio 
theory and argues that socially responsible portfolio management limits the diversifying 
possibilities, leading to an increased risk. As indicated by modern portfolio theory this 
additional risk emerging from optional restrictions heightens the risk and induce addi-
tional costs while the expected return of the portfolio is decreased (Rudd 1981). The study 
by Kahn, Lekander & Leimkuhler (1997) shows empirical evidence to support the under-
performance hypothesis as authors examine the performance of SRI in the U.S. stock 
market by comparing the performance of S&P 500 portfolio to the tobacco-free S&P 500 
portfolio. Kahn et al. (1997) study the performance of SRI by evaluating the effects of 
negative screening on tobacco companies. Tobacco firms are a suitable group for the ex-
amination as the industry is one of the most famous targets of negative screens but still a 
profitable business segment. Based on their investigation Kahn et al. (1997) conclude that 
restriction to not invest in the tobacco industry is a moral decision involving costs related 
to increased risk, restricted possibilities, and transaction costs. 
 
One of the studies endorsing the “doing good but not well” hypothesis is the paper by 
Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang (2008b), in which authors globally investigate the per-
formance of socially responsible mutual funds. The final sample of Renneboog et al. 
(2008b) consists of 440 SRI mutual funds and 16 036 conventional funds from 17 coun-
tries located in Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific. By utilizing the Fama & French 
(1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model the authors are able to 
identify that for most of the countries risk-adjusted returns of the SRI funds range from -
2.2% to -6.5% per annum. Renneboog et al. (2008b) still conclude that this underperfor-
mance is mostly supporting the “no effect” hypothesis as in most of the countries the 
underperformance is not statistically significant. Specifically, only in four out of 17 coun-
tries, including France, Ireland, Sweden and Japan, the underperformance theory is sup-
ported by statistically significant results. In those four countries, Renneboog et al. (2008b) 
report abnormal returns of SRI varying from -4% to -7% per annum. Similar results re-
garding the significant underperformance of SRI mutual funds can be found in papers of 
Geczy, Stambaugh & Levin (2005), Tippet (2001) and Mueller (1991). 
 
Supportive evidence for the “doing good but not well” hypothesis can be found also from 
the paper of Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) as authors empirically confirm that portfolios 
consisting of so-called “sin stocks” yield abnormal returns. Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) 
conclude that social norms impact on stock markets and investors may experience ethical 
penalty by refraining investments based on those norms. Also, the recent paper by Trinks 
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& Scholtens (2017) focuses on studying the effects of controversial investments. Trinks 
& Scholtens (2017) examine a wider set of sinful companies based on fourteen contro-
versial issues that are known to be also a target of negative SRI screening. Authors end 
up with a sample of 1763 stocks over the years 1991-2012 and evaluate the performance 
by Carhart’s (1997) factor model. In conclusion, Trinks & Scholtens (2017) state that by 
negative screening investors may experience significant opportunity costs as in many seg-
ments controversial investments yield abnormal risk-adjusted returns. In other words, SR 
investors are paying a price for being responsible (Trinks & Scholtens 2017).  
 
As the evidence to support the underperformance hypothesis is not exhaustive, the “no 
effect” hypothesis is more widely recognized. Numerous studies including the paper by 
Hamilton et al. (1993) state that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
performance of SRI and the performance of conventional investments. Hamilton et al. 
(1993) examine the returns by calculating the Jensen’s alpha of 32 SRI mutual funds 
during the 1980s and find that when comparing the returns of SRI relative to value-
weighted NYSE returns no significant results are found. Furthermore, the authors reveal 
only statistically insignificant differences by comparing the performance of socially re-
sponsible mutual funds to conventional mutual funds.  
 
Recognizing the evidence of prior research Sauer (1997) criticizes the confounding ef-
fects related to the mutual fund -based findings and states that for example management 
fees, transaction costs and manager’s picking ability might distort the evidence. To pro-
vide pronounced evidence Sauer (1997) utilizes the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI) as a 
well-diversified SRI portfolio that is not subject to the confounding effects to compare 
the returns of the index with two unrestricted and well-diversified benchmark portfolios. 
The employed benchmarks are the S&P 500 index and CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices) value-weighted market index. The study is conducted by measuring raw 
monthly returns, Jensen’s alphas and Sharpe ratios of these three portfolios over the pe-
riod from 1986 through 1994. The findings of the research suggest that the use of socially 
responsible screens as a guideline for investment decisions has neither a negative nor 
positive impact on the risk-adjusted returns of a well-diversified portfolio. (Sauer 1997.) 
 
In line with Sauer (1997) also Statman (2000) considers the performance of the DSI rel-
ative to the S&P 500 index and reveals similar results. The risk-adjusted returns of the 
DSI do not differ from the returns of the S&P 500 index in a statistically significant man-
ner during the years 1990-1998. The paper of Statman (2000) evaluates the performance 
of socially responsible mutual funds as well and states that during the period in question 
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SRI funds performed better than conventional ones however the difference is not statisti-
cally significant. Furthermore, similar results regarding socially responsible mutual funds 
and indices can be found for example from the papers of Bauer, Koedijk & Otten (2005), 
Kreander, Gray, Power & Sinclair (2005) and Schröder (2004). 
 
One of the more recent papers trying to clarify the performance behavior of SRI is the 
paper by Auer & Schuhmacher (2016). Employing a new ESG dataset, based on large, 
mid and small-capitalization companies, authors examine if it is possible to gain abnormal 
risk-adjusted returns based on high or low ESG rated stocks. The dataset of Sustainalytics 
covers firms from the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and Europe during the period 
from August 2004 to December 2012 and offers novel ESG scores based on 70 specific 
indicators. In their paper Auer & Schuhmacher (2016) construct various equally weighted 
portfolios based on the highest and lowest ESG scores with five different cut-off rates 
(5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%).  The total amount of 600 constructed portfolios is de-
rived by using different regional, sectoral and ESG based selection with each cut-off rate 
and includes both the most and the least responsible portfolios. By calculating the Sharpe 
ratio for each portfolio Auer & Schuhmacher (2016) are able to find that in the Asia-
Pacific region and in the United States an investment strategy based on high or low ESG 
ratings does not consistently yield significantly different returns relative to the passive 
benchmark portfolios. Similarly, in Europe high ESG scores do not appear to lead to ab-
normal returns. Instead, authors indicate that within certain industries some ESG based 
strategies might even end up significantly lower returns than the benchmarks. Concluded, 
it is possible for fund managers to provide “responsible profits” for ethical investors but 
abnormal returns must be sought elsewhere. (Auer & Schuhmacher 2016.) 
 
In contrast, prior to the study of Auer & Schuhmacher (2016) various academicians pro-
vide also evidence to support the positive abnormal returns of ESG based strategies. For 
example, early studies of Luther, Matatko & Corner (1992), Diltz (1995) and Mallin, 
Saadouni & Briston (1995) find suggestive signs of weak overperformance by ethical 
funds relative to the conventional ones. Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Koedjik (2005) pro-
vide more sturdy evidence to support the “doing good while doing well” hypothesis by 
studying the relation between corporate eco-efficiency scores and performance. The pa-
per of Derwall et al. (2005) examine portfolios of the most and the least eco-efficient 
stocks based on Innovest database during the period of July 1997 through December 
2003. To measure the performance in an unbiased manner, authors utilize the multifactor 
model of Carhart (1997) and are able to detect that the most eco-efficient companies out-
perform the least eco-efficient ones significantly. Consequently, the evidence suggests 
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that investors should evaluate also the environmental scores while investing in stocks 
(Derwall et al. 2005). 
 
Another paper finding the positive effect of SRI is Kempf and Osthoff (2007), in which 
the SRI returns are examined by a simple long-short portfolio based on ESG criteria. The 
ESG data of the research, including six criteria: community, diversity, employee rela-
tions, environment, human rights, and products, is gathered from the database of Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) and it covers the period from 1992 to 2004. Based on the 
ESG ratings authors construct various high and low rated portfolios to evaluate the per-
formance. In addition, the long-short strategy is implemented by taking a long position 
with the high rated stocks and by shorting the low rated ones. More specifically, the pos-
itive, negative and best in class screening approaches with various ESG aspects and cut-
off rates are employed to build the portfolios and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model is 
exploited to measure the accurate effect. The empirical evidence of the paper firmly states 
that substantial performance increase can be achieved by implementing SRI during the 
period in question. Particularly the paper proposes that the long-short portfolios based on 
the positive screens and the best in class approach yield significant alphas. The highest 
abnormal return of a singular portfolio reported in the paper is 8.7 % per year and is 
achieved by following the best in class method. The abnormal returns reach the level of 
significance even after accounting realistic transaction costs. (Kempf & Osthoff 2007.) 
 
In line with Kempf & Osthoff (2007) also Statman & Glushkov (2009) find evidence to 
support the outperformance of SRI relative to conventional portfolios. In their paper, Stat-
man & Glushkov (2009) analyze the returns of the ESG based best in class portfolios 
based on KLD data and conclude that by using certain ESG aspects abnormally positive 
returns can be reached. Notably, the paper suggests that socially responsible investors 
should concentrate on high scores of communal, employee relational and environmental 
aspects of stocks and to gain the highest returns investors should implement the best in 
class approach without shunning sin industries. Authors still admit the conflicts that might 
occur when socially responsible investors should include sin companies in their SRI port-
folios to enhance profitability. Nevertheless, evidence to support the “doing good while 
doing well” hypothesis is provided. (Statman & Glushkov 2009.)  
 
Moreover, supportive evidence for the overperformance theory can be found from the 
paper of Edmans (2011), in which the relationship between employee satisfaction and 
stock prices is under investigation. The employee relations data is based on the list of the 
“100 Best Companies to Work for in America” published by Fortune magazine. By 
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evaluating the listed firms Edmans (2011) confirm that abnormal long-term returns can 
be achieved based on employee satisfaction. Hence, the evidence states that capital mar-
kets are not able to value intangibles correctly and SRI screens may offer additional value 
for investors (Edmans 2011). Similar conclusions based on the environmental dimension 
of individual companies are made by Chan & Walters (2014). They report that their en-
vironmentally oriented portfolios yield approximately 7 % annual alpha based on Car-
hart’s (1997) four-factor model (Chan & Walter 2014).  
 
Further, Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and ter Horst (2013) examine whether the quality of 
firms’ stakeholder relations, in general, is an incorrectly priced intangible asset that im-
pacts stock prices as Edmans (2011) stated. The methods of Borgers et al. (2013) include 
building a stakeholder-relations index (SI) for U.S. firms over the period 1992-2009. By 
building the SI based portfolios authors are able to detect abnormal returns between the 
years 1992-2004. Nonetheless, the effect ceases to exist after the mentioned period, prob-
ably because of the learning of investors. As the standard economic theory explains the 
mispriced information disappears through time as investors learn about the effect. Borgers 
et al. (2013) explain that increased financial media attention, academic interest, and pro-
posals by institutional investors started the learning effect of investors leading to the dis-
appearance of SI based returns in 2004. Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang (2013) provide similar 
evidence of learning effect with their study in which abnormal alphas related to good 
governance disappear after the governance issues gain more public attention.  
 
As shown above mixed and vary results regarding the profitability of SRI exist. One of 
the possible reasons is the heterogeneity of the field but also the different time periods 
and methods confound the field. Some recent studies declare that the learning hypothesis 
can resolve the heterogeneity regarding the performance issue. This thesis will centralize 
its focus to understand the results by investigating the option of time-varying SRI returns.  
 
 
3.2. SRI during crisis 
 
This thesis examines the possibility that SRI is only booming during times when aggre-
gate wealth is at a high level, hence a strand of pervious literature studying the SRI during 
market crisis provides an interesting addition to the literature review. This thesis concen-
trates on economic downturns and recessions as the below presented literature focus on 
crisis periods. It is important to notice that these time periods differ in length and in timing 
and are not the same.  
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Perhaps the most seminal paper investigating SRI during the crisis period is the paper by 
Lins, Servaes & Tamayo (2017). In their paper Lins et al. (2017) examine the effect of 
additional trust and social capital on firm performance. Authors state that the advantage 
exists, and this additional trust achieved by implementing high-quality CSR policies can 
be an important factor during a market crisis. Lins et al. (2017) conduct their study by 
utilizing firms’ ESG data from the MSCI ESG STATS (former KLD) database to detect 
the high and low ESG rated firms. The final sample consists of data of 1673 firms during 
the recent financial crisis from August 2008 to March 2009. The paper of Lins et al. 
(2017) provides empirical evidence suggesting that firms with high social capital are 
trustworthy during the market crisis and hence less prone to perform poorly relative to 
the conventional firms. Specifically, firms that entered the recent financial crisis period 
with high ESG ratings performed statistically significantly better than companies that en-
tered the crisis with low ratings. Further, Lins et al. (2017) state that there is no difference 
in returns based on ESG ratings during the post-crisis period. Summarized, CSR based 
social capital can be viewed as an insurance policy that may pay off when a severe crisis 
is faced (Lins et al. 2017). 
 
Also, an earlier study by Godfrey, Merril & Hansen (2009) investigates the insurance-
like feature possibly gained by CSR actions. Godfrey et al. (2009) suggest that the rela-
tionship between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance ex-
ists and examine the insurance-like behavior during different events. The results show 
that during various events implemented CSR strategies might offer value for shareholders 
and the significance of the effect depends on the target of these CSR activities. Godfrey 
et al. (2009) conclude that to gain the hedging effect CSR must be implemented on behalf 
of secondary stakeholders or society in general. Another paper finding the relation be-
tween downside risk protection and social responsibility is the paper by Nofsinger & 
Varma (2014) in which mutual fund data is examined to certify how ESG screens impact 
on the returns. Particularly, Nofsinger & Varma (2014) report that SR mutual funds em-
ploying positive screening methods outperform conventional funds significantly during 
the market crisis but during non-crisis periods such social responsibility induces costs. In 
conclusion, risk-averse investors may pay an additional cost during steady periods to gain 
protection in case of the most turbulent times (Nofsinger & Varma 2014).  
 
The same issue is approached by several additional studies including for example research 
by Nakai, Yamaguchi & Takeuchi (2016) and Bouslah, Kryzanowski & M’Zali (2018). 
Nakai et al. (2016) find the buffering effect of Japanese SRI funds during the recent 
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financial crisis and conclude that SRI funds significantly outperformed the conventional 
ones during the recent crisis. Bouslah et al. (2018) instead examine the relation of social 
performance and firm-risk during the period 1991-2012. The paper of Bouslah et al. 
(2018) reveals that firms who have reached a high level of social performance offer in-
vestors significant risk reduction possibilities during the crisis. The empirical evidence is 
based on MSCI ESG STATS data and further indicates that the relation between firms’ 
ESG based strengths and overall risk mostly explains the effect. Consequently, authors 
suggest that during crisis significant volatility reduction can be gained by investing in 
firms that possess high-quality CSR strengths (Bouslah et al. 2018). In contrast, for ex-
ample Leite & Cortez (2015) and Syed (2017) do not find a significant difference in re-
turns of European SRI funds and conventional funds during the recent crisis. In summary, 
the research of Leite & Cortez (2015) considers French SRI funds and does not find the 
hedging effect of SRI relative. Instead, the evidence of the paper suggests that SR inves-
tors might pay a price for ethics during non-crisis periods and can match the performance 
of non-SR investors during market downturns (Leite & Cortez 2015). In addition, Syed 
(2017) examine the performance of French and British SRI funds, overall findings do not 
show statistically significant evidence on behalf of under- or overperformance during cri-
sis periods. 
 
In conclusion, previous studies mostly suggest that high-quality CSR is a much-appreci-
ated feature during the crisis and socially responsible firms outperform their benchmarks 
during market meltdowns because of several reasons including trust, brand, reputation, 
employee morale, customer loyalty and social capital in general (Lins et al. 2017; Bouslah 
et al. 2018). As the intention of this thesis is to study the possible luxurious behavior of 
SRI the previous evidence is somewhat contrary to the hypothesis of the thesis. The hy-
pothesis suggests that ESG based investment strategies perform well only when the ag-
gregate wealth is at a high level. It is still important to notice that economically bad times 
are not the same as crisis periods. For example, economically bad times tend to last longer 
than crisis periods and usually, recovery periods from the crisis are economically bad 
times. For example, Lins et al. (2017) use the period from August 2008 to March 2009 as 
the crisis period and the corresponding recession period is 10 months longer from De-
cember 2007 to June 2009 defined by the NBER. Further, Lins et al. (2017) state that 
during the recovery period there is no difference between the returns of high and low ESG 
rated firms. 
 
 
3.3. Evidence of wealth dependent preferences 
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This thesis is based on the idea of Bansal, Wu & Yaron (2018). In their working paper 
titled “Is Socially Responsible Investing A Luxury Good?” Bansal et al. (2018) examine 
the possible time variability of SRI based abnormal returns. Their paper targets to clarify 
how the contradiction in the field of SRI can be explained as all three hypotheses regard-
ing the performance have their own proponents and also the relation between CSR and 
CFP still remains obscure. To address the issue Bansal et al. (2018) have various different 
approaches to test the hypothesis regarding the time-varying SRI alpha. The paper em-
ploys the firm-level ESG data from MSCI ESG STATS including eight major categories 
of corporate social responsibility: community (impact on the community), diversity (prac-
tices on racial and gender diversity), employment (employee satisfaction), environment 
(environmental impact), governance (investor relations and managerial responsibility), 
human right (practices affecting on human rights), product (quality, and impact on society 
and environment) and sin (sin concerns). Within every category, several sub-criteria exist 
and each of them can be defined as a strength or concern. The initial ESG data includes 
S&P 500 companies from 1991 to 2000, Russel 1000 companies from 2001 to 2002, and 
Russel 3000 companies from 2003 to 2013, forming the entire examining period from 
January 1991 to December 2013. (Bansal et al. 2018.) 
 
Based on the ESG strengths and concerns Bansal et al. (2018) are finally able to compute 
overall social responsibility score and individual SR category scores for each firm. These 
ratings are utilized to compile 10 equal-weighted deciles for each score and for the overall 
score. Decile 10 represents the top portfolio with the best SR-rated companies and decile 
1 the bottom portfolio with the least responsible ones. Furthermore, Bansal et al. (2018) 
compile long-short portfolios from each decile set, by subtracting the top decile from the 
bottom decile. The performance evaluation is conducted by using 36-month rolling re-
gression. The paper provides portfolio alphas based on Carhart’s (1997) factor model and 
the results of the general evaluation show that “good” firms have marginally higher alphas 
than “bad” firms, approximately 0.15 % per month. The categories of environment, gov-
ernance, and product mainly drive the result as these are the only statistically significant 
categories, with the monthly alpha ranging from 0.32 % to 0.44 %. However, the alpha 
displays high time variability even if the distribution of SR scores has remained relatively 
consistent throughout the sample period. For example, during the recent recession be-
tween 2007 and 2009 Bansal et al. (2018) reports, in contrast for example to the research 
of Lins et al. (2017), a significant negative relationship between the returns and SR scores. 
(Bansal et al. 2018.) 
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Further, the paper of Bansal et al. (2018) investigates the main hypothesis of wealth de-
pendent preference shifts of investors toward SRI. Particularly, Bansal et al. (2018) argue 
that investors view SRI as a luxury good and investing in responsible stock is a discre-
tionary decision affected by the level of aggregate wealth. The reasoning is that during 
periods when the aggregate wealth is at high level investors can afford to be SRI-con-
scious. In other words, investors can afford to temporarily deviate from the efficient fron-
tier by investing in high SR-rated stocks. Bansal et al (2018) reason that investor actions 
may drive the demand of SRI resulting in higher abnormal returns. When the aggregate 
wealth declines investors are forced to ignore their discretionary SR desires to meet their 
fundamental needs. Basically, investors adjust their portfolios back to the efficient fron-
tier driving the SRI returns down. To implement the analysis Bansal et al. (2018) create 
two indicators for “economically good times” using cyclicality-adjusted real P/E ratios 
and one-year real GDP growth projections. In addition, the NBER recession periods are 
employed. Finally, the hypothesis regarding luxury-good-like behavior is tested by com-
paring the returns of SRI to the consumption of luxury goods and to the sales growth of 
luxury retailers. (Bansal et al. 2018.) 
 
The results of Bansal et al. (2018) indicate that the four-factor alpha of the top-bottom 
portfolio is pronounced during “good times” and not significant during “regular” or “bad 
times”, during the recession the alpha might even be significantly negative. In summary, 
responsible stocks earn significantly higher alphas during “good times” relative to irre-
sponsible stocks, beyond “good times” the difference becomes mainly insignificant. Fur-
thermore, the time-varying alpha spread of the top-minus-bottom portfolio displays a high 
correlation, correlation coefficient 0.528, with the per capita consumption of jewelry and 
watches. The spread is also correlating with real luxury sales by a coefficient of 0.329. 
Findings above suggest wealth dependent preferences of investors toward SRI when the 
growth of consumption is high then SRI is a reckoned investment option.  
 
To provide more comprehensive evidence Bansal et al. (2018) form an event study to 
detect market reactions on CSR related announcements during different economic times. 
Interestingly, when Bansal et al. (2018) study the intra-day effect of 5 327 positive CSR-
related announcements, findings show that on average announcements do not create sig-
nificant market reactions. However during good economic times, these announcements 
yield an abnormal return of 0.09 % on average and during bad times abnormal return is 
even negative, approximately 0.06 %. Additionally, similar results are detected with a 
longer event window. Finally, after several robustness checks, the authors conclude that 
investors’ preference shifts based on the aggregate wealth may drive the demand for SRI 
41 
 
investments and thus create the luxury-good-like behavior of socially responsible invest-
ing. Basically, consumers can afford luxuries and investors can afford to be socially re-
sponsible during boom markets. (Bansal et al. 2018.) 
 
The findings of Bansal et al. (2018) have several implications. First, it highlights the im-
portance of investor preferences secondly when evaluating the relation between CSR and 
CFP the cash flow-based aspects might not be as important as previous research mostly 
suggest. Thirdly, it provides important insight for the fund managers and to designers of 
SRI products as the economic forecasting ability appears to be the key to the well-per-
forming SRI. Finally, based on the evidence of the paper SR investors do not have to pay 
a so-called ethical penalty for being responsible. Apparently, they only must realize that 
the returns might vary over time and if they want to outperform the market at least the 
level of responsibility should be adjusted over time. (Bansal et al. 2018.) 
 
Although the empirical evidence towards the wealth dependent preference structure of 
SRI is a novel opening, the idea that the level of wealth influences on investment choices 
is rather a primitive notion. Additionally, the SRI motive oriented previous literature no-
tices the level of wealth as one of the possible drivers behind the responsible investing. 
Some investors are willing to invest in a responsible way albeit they are told that SRI 
induce underperformance (Sparkes 1998; Lewis & Mackezie 1999) and for example, Tip-
pet & Leung (2001) suppose that ethical investors might be wealthier and therefore able 
to bear additional costs. Moreover, similar behavior applies to corporate finance as im-
plemented CSR activities might depend on the past earnings and the financial constraints 
of a company. Hong, Kubik & Scheinkman (2012) conclude that firms are more likely to 
do good when they do well and the hypothesis of “doing well by doing good” is doubtful. 
In their paper Hong et al. (2012) show that in general financially constrained firms are 
doing less CSR. Further, their study reveals that when financial constraints fade away, 
for example during the booming market, previously constrained companies are increasing 
the amount of CSR actions. Consequently, corporate goodness may vary over time with 
the level of financial constraints in a similar manner as the demand of SRI may vary 
depending on the aggregate wealth. (Hong et al. 2012.) 
 
Considering the evidence of previous performance-based research and the hypotheses of 
earlier motivation-based literature this thesis admits that the reasoning behind the idea of 
Bansal et al. (2018) is recognizable, current and worthy to explore more closely. Even 
though some findings, for example, the seminal findings of Lins et al. (2017) are contrary 
to the hypothesis.   
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4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
In this chapter of the thesis the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Modern Portfolio The-
ory and the most common stock valuation methods within the field of socially responsi-
ble investing are briefly presented. These concepts are substantive before any further 
orientation to the methods of the thesis. 
 
 
4.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Fama (1970) presents the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) stating that a market is 
efficient when it always fully reflects all available information. The hypothesis states that 
it is not possible to gain excess returns since stock prices always reflect all market infor-
mation accurately at any point in time. Only new and relevant information can cause 
changes in stock prices and the reaction of the price change will be immediate and fully 
correct. There appears neither over- or underreactions nor delayed reactions in efficient 
markets. After the reaction, new price always contains all possible and relevant infor-
mation. (Fama 1970.)  
 
Further, the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that the market efficiency can be di-
vided into three categories each representing a certain level of efficiency. First, the weak-
form efficiency means that information subset is only historical, and prices contain all 
available information for example from past price changes, returns, and trading volumes. 
In the weak-form of efficient markets, it is impossible to forecast future prices from his-
torical return data. Therefore, it is not possible to find any patterns to gain excess returns 
and technical analysis is made useless by weak-form market efficiency. (Fama 1970; 
Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2018.) 
 
Second, the semi-strong efficiency measures whether prices reflect entirely historical in-
formation and the information that is obviously available for the public. Public infor-
mation includes for example annual and quarterly earnings announcements and stock 
splits. When all this public information is reflected in prices there is no possibility to gain 
excess returns on the market. Third, the strong form of market efficiency is the level 
where prices reflect all available information. The strong form includes weak and semi-
strong efficiency but also all other information that is under monopolistic access. There-
fore, in strong form market efficiency means that stock prices react immediately and 
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correctly for example also corporates’ inside information. In strong efficient markets, it 
is impossible to gain profits even with inside information. (Fama 1970; Bodie et al. 2018.) 
 
Regarding SRI the efficient markets would mean that any abnormal returns cannot be 
yielded based on ESG screening methods as stock prices should always reflect also the 
valuable CSR related information. Thereby, if the efficient market hypothesis is correct 
SR investors are investing in responsible stocks to meet their personal values or to gain 
other non-profit benefits. Still, for example the strongly efficient markets are highly 
doubtful concept and normally inside information is not fully reflected by the market 
prices. Hence, CSR information might provide benefits, for example, to risk management 
purposes, as some proponents of the outperformance hypothesis suggest that ESG screen-
ing protects the investor against the “scandal risk” (Hamilton et al. 1993; Statman & 
Glushkov 2009). At the same time, investors should use common sense to realize that on 
average equity markets are fairly efficient and if the outperformance of SRI would be 
continuous there would be market participants to exploit it. As for example Borgers et al. 
(2013) state that investors’ learning effect might explain the disappearance of SRI returns 
in their sample. 
 
 
4.2. Modern Portfolio Theory 
 
One of the most fundamental theories of modern finance is the portfolio theory by Mar-
kowitz (1952). In principle, Markowitz (1952) finds that the minimum variance frontier 
of risky assets exists, and an investor should be interested only in investing in the upper 
half of the minimum variance frontier known as the efficient frontier. The efficient fron-
tier consists only of portfolios offering the highest expected return at a certain level of 
risk. In other words, investors should minimize the standard deviation of the portfolio 
while pursuing a certain level of expected returns. Hence, rational market participants 
desire only investments in an optimal portfolio from the efficient frontier. Figure 3 below 
shows that diversification is the only possibility when forming an efficient portfolio as 
individual assets offer lower risk-adjusted returns relative to the efficient portfolios. To 
construct an efficient and optimal portfolio investor should have access to the whole in-
vestment universe. Any constraints during portfolio construction will deteriorate the pro-
cess. (Bodie et al. 2018; Markowitz 1952.) 
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Figure 3. The minimum variance frontier and the efficient frontier of risky assets (Bodie 
et al. 2018). 
 
 
Consequently, any restrictions influence directly to the portfolio and cause deviation from 
the efficient frontier. Therefore, ESG screens cannot be implemented without additional 
costs as the optimal portfolio is harmed over the screening process. Induced costs can be 
justifiable only because of the underlying cause (Bodie et al. 2018). In practice, a socially 
responsible strategy limit managers’ allocation possibilities and thus should lead to addi-
tional costs such as increased risk or lower performance. The “doing good but not well” 
hypothesis should be the only possibility if we believe the modern portfolio theory. (Rudd 
1981.) 
 
 
4.3. Asset pricing and Carhart’s Four Factor Model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed in the mid-1960s by William 
Sharpe, John Lintner, and Jack Treynor is maybe the most prominent asset pricing model 
in the field of finance. While the CAPM suggests that in competitive markets systematic 
risk directly explains the returns of an asset, nowadays it is widely considered as not the 
perfect model and alternative elaborated models have been established (Bodie et al. 
2018). First, Fama & French (1996) reform the model by adding factors for size (SMB) 
and value (HML) since the CAPM is not able to price these traits of stocks’ correctly, the 
model is called Fama-French three-factor model. With these additional factors, Fama & 
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French (1996) suggest that all abnormal returns can be explained with the formula that is 
displayed below. 
 
(1.) 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝑛𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
    Ri = return on stock/portfolio i 
    Rf = risk free interest rate 
    αi = intercept of stock/portfolio i 
    bi = factor beta for market factor 
    RM = return on a broad market portfolio  
    si = factor beta for size factor 
    SMB = Small Minus Big 
    hi = factor beta for value factor 
    HML = High Minus Low 
    εi = influence of other factors affecting on stock i  
 
Even though the Fama-French three-factor model is an advanced alternative compared to 
the CAPM it still lacks the capability to explain certain anomalistic returns, for example 
the returns based on the momentum effect (Fama & French 1996; Bodie et al. 2018). 
While trying to explain momentum profits Carhart (1997) suggests that momentum is an 
important common factor of stock returns and constructs a factor model including a mo-
mentum factor. Carhart’s four-factor model presents an additional factor to the Fama-
French three-factor model that captures a one-year momentum anomaly. The additional 
one-year momentum factor (WML) shows the difference between a portfolio of firms 
with the highest last twelve-month returns without the returns of formation month and 
firms with the lowest last twelve-month returns without the returns of formation month. 
Hence, in Carhart’s model, the momentum factor shows difference between so-called 
winners and losers portfolios. The model is presented below. (Carhart 1997.) 
 
(2.) 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝑛𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + ℎ𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
hi = factor beta for one-year momentum factor 
WML = Winners Minus Losers 
 
Carhart (1997) suggests that his model captures much more accurately momentum returns 
compared for example to the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model, hence 
providing more accurate pricing for assets. Carhart’s four-factor model is widely 
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accredited among academic research and still, a practical model to use as the amount of 
the factors is not overwhelming.  As the previous literature in the field of SRI reveals it 
is also one of the most used models regarding the performance driven research of SRI. 
Because of the mentioned position of Carhart’s four-factor model also this thesis utilizes 
it for the empirical evaluation. 
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5. DATA AND METHODS 
 
This section presents the data and the methods used for the empirical analysis of the the-
sis. First subchapter presents the source of the data in general. The second part describes 
the details of the data and in the final subchapter the empirical methods of this thesis are 
addressed.   
 
5.1. Databases 
 
Nowadays as socially responsible investing is gaining more attention among investors 
and academicians, also the amount of reckoned data providers is increasing. In the SRI 
driven academic literature, the most used database is the MSCI ESG STATS and other 
worthy data providers include for example Thomson Reuters ASSET4, KLD Research & 
Analytics, Bloomberg, CSRHUB and Sustainalytics. For example, the closely related pa-
per by Bansal et al. (2018) utilizes the MSCI ESG STATS data. This thesis employs the 
ESG rating data gathered from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database and thus offers 
an additional contribution relative to the paper of Bansal et al. (2018).  
 
The Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database monitors over 280 ESG key performance indi-
cators based on four different measure categories for thousands of the world’s leading 
companies. These evaluated ESG categories include commonly used environmental, so-
cial and corporate governance aspects but also additionally ASSET4 evaluates firms’ eco-
nomic features regarding responsibility. Environmental aspect includes consideration 
based on resource reduction, product innovation, and emission reduction. Social segment 
assesses responsibilities for example based on employment quality, health, and safety, 
human rights and community. On the other hand, governance attends to problems regard-
ing for example board structure, compensation policy, and shareholder rights. Further, 
economical aspects consider responsibility for example based on client loyalty, perfor-
mance, and shareholder loyalty. Based on these four aspects of responsibility ASSET4 
offers the equally weighted rating for the firms under evaluation, below the thesis refers 
to the equally weighted ratings as “EW scores”. These four aspects and the EW scores 
offered by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database are referred below as “ASSET4 ESG 
scores”. Table 1 below shows the number of measures, weighting, and categories behind 
the ASSET4 ESG scores. The EW scores are calculated based on the total count of 282 
categories and the weights displayed in the table. A score is a number between 0 and 100 
demonstrating how the company performs compared to the entire ASSET4 universe re-
garding a certain measuring aspect. Nowadays the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 is updated 
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and the database is called Refinitive ESG Scores. This thesis uses the ASSET4 ESG 
scores of S&P 500 firms and the utilized data-period covers the years from 2002 to 2017. 
(Refinitive 2019.) 
 
 
Table 1. Thomson Reuters ASSET4 categories, amount of measures and weights (Refin-
itive 2019). 
 
Categories and subcategories Measures Weight 
Environment 70 25 % 
Resource reduction 17 8.33 % 
Emission reduction  28 8.33 % 
Product innovation  25 8.33 % 
Social  88 25 % 
Employment quality 17 3.57 % 
Health and safety 9 3.57 % 
Training and development  10 3.57 % 
Diversity and opportunities 10 3.57 % 
Human rights 8 3.57 % 
Community 15 3.57 % 
Product responsibility 19 3.57 % 
Governance 68 25 % 
Board structure 17 5 % 
Compensation policy 13 5 % 
Board functions  15 5 % 
Shareholder rights 11 5 % 
Vision and strategy 12 5 % 
Economic 56 25 % 
Client loyalty 18 8.33 % 
Performance 16 8.33 % 
Shareholder loyalty 22 8.33 % 
   
Total count (as a base for EW score) 282 100 % 
 
 
Additionally, the return data of the S&P 500 firms are utilized to evaluate the performance 
of SRI portfolios based on ASSET4 ESG scores. The return data is gathered from Thom-
son Reuters Datastream. To estimate the risk-adjusted returns of the SRI portfolios the 
factor data regarding market, size, value and momentum factors is employed from the 
Kenneth French’s website. Additionally, the thesis utilizes the business cycle data from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to detect if SRI returns fluctuate over 
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time with the business cycle. The latest recession period from December 2007 to June 
2009 is exploited. Finally, to detect the luxury-good-like behavior of SRI the thesis em-
ploys the data of U.S. personal consumption expenditures regarding jewelry and watches. 
Luxury consumption data is from the database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
5.1.1. ESG data description 
 
The main data of the thesis includes two samples gathered from the Thomson Reuters 
database. First, the data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 consists of the ASSET4 ESG 
scores for 500 companies that were listed in the S&P 500 index in 2019. The data period 
includes year-end observations for a 16-year period from 2002 to 2017. The ASSET4 
sample results in 6505 scores for each category and the yearly coverage for these catego-
ries variates from 233 firm-specific observations in 2002 to 498 observations in 2016. 
The total amount ends up with over 32,000 observations including equally weighted 
scores and scores for each of the four individual categories. The period in question is 
limited as the ASSET4 ESG data is not available for the years before 2002. Secondly, the 
corresponding end-of the-the-month total return index values for the S&P 500 companies 
are gathered from the Thomson Reuters Datastream for the period of 2003-2018. Based 
on the gathered end-of-the-month values the final return sample includes over 88,000 
observations during the 192-month period. 
 
Figure 4 below shows the frequency distributions regarding the ASSET4 ESG scores dur-
ing the sample period. The Y-axis demonstrates the frequency of observations in each of 
the percentiles and the X-axis showcases the percentiles from 0 to 100. The figure demon-
strates that especially scores regarding the environmental aspect varies interestingly be-
tween percentiles, as both low (10th) and high (90th) percentile scores are much more 
frequent than scores in between. The pattern might indicate that companies either have a 
strong orientation towards environmental issues or lack the aspiration almost completely. 
The similar but weaker pattern occurs with social scores. In contrast in governance and 
economic categories, most companies are able to score in high percentiles. Especially 
high scores are reached in the governance category as only a few companies fall to per-
centiles below the 50th.  
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Figure 4. Frequency distributions of ASSET4 ESG categories. 
 
The figure illustrates frequency distributions of all ASSET4 ESG scores including “EW score”, “Environment”, 
“Social”, “Governance” and “Economic” categories. The “EW score” represents the descriptive statistics of 
Equally Weighted scores. A firm-specific year-end score may vary from 0 to 100 in each category. X-axis 
demonstrates the score percentiles and Y-axis the frequency. 
 
 
The difference between these distribution patterns may arise for example from the fact 
that importance of environmental and social categories is fairly new concern for many 
companies while governance and economic aspects have been vital for a long time. The 
novel importance of environmental and social aspects might lead to the observed fre-
quency patterns where several companies have issues to perform well in these categories. 
Furthermore, as the sample consists of S&P 500 firms without industry specification, 
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differences between industries might explain the patterns of environmental and social 
scores. On the contrary in more traditional categories it is easier to achieve high scores as 
these fields have already been consequential for decades in all industries. Based on above 
mentioned four aspects the EW score distribution display a spike with the highest percen-
tiles while the lowest percentile scores are rare and approximately from 15th percentile to 
80th percentile the frequency of scores is comparatively stable. 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 2 are offered to underline the findings of the frequency 
distributions in Figure 4. The table presents descriptive statistics of all 6505 observation 
in each category and clarifies the similarities between environmental and social aspects 
as well as governance and economical categories. Particularly, the mean of governance 
scores is notable higher being approximately 77 than the mean in environment and social 
categories approximately 54 and 58, respectively. Further, the standard deviation of gov-
ernance scores is considerably lower being approximately 16 than the standard deviation 
of environment and social aspects which are approximately 33 and 29, respectively. Sim-
ilar but moderate differences can be seen when comparing economic category with the 
environmental and social aspects.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of ASSET4 ESG score distributions. 
Descriptive statistics in the table are calculated from the whole sample period of 2002-2017. The total amount 
of firm-specific year-end scores is 32,525. The table represents the score distribution of ASSET4 ESG 
scores including “EW score”, “Environment”, “Social”, “Governance” and “Economic” categories. The “EW 
score” represents the descriptive statistics of Equally Weighted scores. The table displays the mean, median, 
minimum (“Min.”) and maximum (“Max.”) values, and the standard deviation (“Std. Dev.”). “N.” represents 
the number of observations. 
  Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev. N. 
Environment 54.28 58.16 8.16 97.43 32.65 6505 
Social 57.90 62.44 3.56 99.35 28.75 6505 
Governance 77.70 81.32 1.54 98.23 15.71 6505 
Economic 64.35 70.90 1.74 98.91 26.38 6505 
EW score 66.13 74.46 2.99 98.71 27.35 6505 
  
 
Because Figure 4 and Table 2 report the scores based on the whole sample period, Figure 
5 below is presented to illustrate the development of the scores during the years in ques-
tion. The year-specific scores displayed in the figure are the average annual ratings of 
ASSET4 ESG categories. As it can be seen from Figure 5 an increasing trend is distinct 
from all of the categories and also the mean EW score is increasing firmly from 2002 to 
52 
 
2017. Nevertheless, there are differences between categories, for example social and en-
vironmental scores have increased the most. Here the explanation may again relate to the 
growing awareness of ESG matters. Especially environmental and social aspects are 
seemingly gaining more attention in an accelerating pace and catching up the level of 
governance scores. Overall S&P 500 companies are obviously enhancing their efforts 
towards ESG matters. 
 
 
Figure 5. Annual mean values of ASSET4 ESG scores. 
 
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
The empirical part of the thesis studies the performance of socially responsible investing 
and especially the possible time variability of SRI based returns. The SRI strategy used 
in this thesis is a positive screening strategy as the main performance evaluation is made 
by studying the returns of long-short portfolios by buying the most responsible companies 
and selling the least responsible companies. Below the portfolio construction is explained 
in depth. 
 
First, the thesis sorts S&P 500 firms into ten deciles based on their equally weighted 
responsibility scores. Additionally, the sorting is also performed based on the individual 
categories of environmental, social, governance, and economic ratings. The sorting is 
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performed by comparing the year-end score values in each of the five categories sepa-
rately. The intention is to find the top and bottom 10 % of companies for every year from 
2002 to 2017 in every category. As a result, the thesis utilizes these five top and bottom 
groups to form portfolios based on the ratings. To be more precise, as the scores variate 
from 0 to 100 in each category, the top portfolios include firms with the highest respon-
sibility ratings and the bottom portfolios are formed from the companies with the lowest 
scores. The final top and bottom groups of each category include approximately 10 % of 
the best and worst-performing companies. The year-specific amount of companies can 
vary slightly between the top and bottom groups as if there is more than one equal value 
at the 10 % borderline every one of these evenly rated companies are included in the 
group. For example, because of the issue of numerous borderline values in the bottom 
group, the bottom decile of the environmental category in 2006 includes 43 companies 
while the top decile contains only 36 companies. The descriptive statistics of the top and 
bottom groups are displayed in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of top and bottom groups for the whole sample period. 
Descriptive statistics in the table are calculated from the whole sample period of 2002-2017. The table rep-
resents the descriptive statistics of ASSET4 ESG scores based on top and bottom groups including “EW 
score”, “Environment”, “Social”, “Governance” and “Economic” categories. The “EW score” represents the 
Equally Weighted score. The table displays the mean, median, minimum (“Min.”) and maximum (“Max.”) 
values, and the standard deviation (“Std. Dev.”). “N.” represents the number of observations. 
  Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. N. 
Environment Top 94.47 94.36 1.25 89.56 97.43 653 
Environment Bottom 12.10 10.29 3.02 8.16 18.57 726 
Social top 94.94 94.97 1.76 88.72 99.35 657 
Social bottom 12.39 10.75 6.20 3.56 37.60 658 
Governance top 95.27 95.35 1.38 90.79 98.23 655 
Governance bottom 44.11 47.85 13.10 1.54 64.46 657 
Economic top  96.02 96.02 1.43 91.90 98.91 655 
Economic bottom 15.73 13.59 9.86 1.74 49.03 658 
EW score top  96.14 96.01 0.94 93.60 98.71 656 
EW score bottom 18.83 17.70 8.90 2.99 54.36 657 
 
 
As the table above indicates the differences between top and bottom portfolios are sub-
stantial and hence this partition offers a suitable base for the portfolio construction of the 
thesis. As table 3 shows the bottom portfolio of the environmental category is the most 
prone to the borderline issue but the feature of the data does not affect the final results 
significantly as the final portfolio equally weights the companies of each group. Portfolios 
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are shaped based on these top and bottom groups of each year. The idea is to form top 
and bottom portfolios at the beginning of each year based on the scores from the previous 
year. After the one year holding period of portfolios are reallocated again at the beginning 
of the next year when the new ASSET4 ESG data is available. Accordingly, the top and 
bottom portfolios of year t are formed based on the ASSET4 ESG scores from the year t-
1. The holding period is from the beginning of January of year t to the end of December 
of the year. As a result, 10 portfolios for each year covering the period from 2003 to 2018 
are received. The portfolios are equally weighted and offer the average return of the com-
pany group. The approach of equal weighting is appropriate as all companies are S&P 
500 companies. Portfolio formation is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
              … 
 
 
 
               … 
 
 
Figure 6. Portfolio forming process.    
 
 
As an example, the top EW portfolio of 2008 includes the best 10 % of companies based 
on the EW score of 2007, the holding period of the portfolio is from the beginning of 
January 2008 to the end of December 2008. At the beginning of January 2009, the port-
folio is reallocated based on the EW scores received from the year 2008. After formatting 
the top and bottom portfolios the top-minus-bottom portfolios of each category are con-
structed. The top-minus-bottom portfolios are plain long-short portfolios buying the top 
group and selling the bottom group of companies from a certain category. The returns of 
these long-short portfolios are calculated by reducing the average excess return of the 
companies in the bottom group from the average excess return of the companies in the 
top group. As a result, the final amount of ASSET4 ESG portfolios used for the return 
evaluation of SRI in this thesis is 15 including top, bottom and top-minus-bottom portfo-
lios of environment, social, governance, economic and equally weighted categories. The 
return evaluation is conducted by using monthly total return index stock data and the 
transaction costs are not taken into account.  
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Below Table 4 presents summary statistics regarding the excess returns of 15 formed 
portfolios. The provided excess returns are calculated from the monthly returns of the 
whole sample period of 2003 to 2018 by using the 1-month T-bill rate gathered from the 
website of Kenneth French (2019). 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of monthly excess returns. 
 
The table displays descriptive statistics of the monthly excess returns of the 15 constructed ASSET4 ESG 
portfolios. The period covers the months from January 2003 to December 2018 including total of 192 monthly 
observations for each portfolio. Statistics for each of the five categories are provided and “EW” indicates the 
portfolio based on the equally weighted ESG score of ASSET4. “Top” (“Bot”) indicates that the portfolio 
includes the companies of top (bottom) group of a given category. “Top-Bot” refers to the top-minus-bottom 
portfolio of a given category. The table displays the mean, median, minimum (“Min.”) and maximum (“Max.”) 
values, and the standard deviation (“Std. Dev.”), skewness (“Skew.”) and kurtosis of each portfolio. 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis 
Environment Top 0.0092 0.0136 -0.1999 0.1700 0.045 -0.468 6.064 
Environment Bot 0.0126 0.0156 -0.2020 0.2061 0.046 -0.649 7.078 
Environment Top-Bot -0.0033 -0.0039 -0.0686 0.0675 0.021 0.203 4.648 
Social Top 0.0082 0.0112 -0.1988 0.1568 0.041 -0.739 7.252 
Social Bot 0.0139 0.0175 -0.2366 0.2744 0.049 -0.250 9.875 
Social Top-bot -0.0057 -0.0065 -0.1177 0.0723 0.022 -0.566 6.931 
Governance Top 0.0095 0.0120 -0.2171 0.1410 0.042 -1.061 7.678 
Governance Bot 0.0140 0.0167 -0.2209 0.2588 0.049 -0.292 8.032 
Governance Top-Bot -0.0045 -0.0059 -0.1178 0.0423 0.021 -0.765 6.683 
Economic Top 0.0086 0.0127 -0.1923 0.1331 0.041 -0.832 6.278 
Economic Bot 0.0160 0.0170 -0.2024 0.2683 0.055 0.102 6.016 
Economic Top-Bot -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.1352 0.0705 0.027 -0.976 7.477 
EW Top 0.0092 0.0117 -0.1675 0.1252 0.038 -0.623 5.470 
EW Bot 0.0160 0.0203 -0.2349 0.2050 0.048 -0.708 7.134 
EW Top-Bot -0.0068 -0.0073 -0.0798 0.0673 0.023 -0.095 3.947 
 
 
Interestingly the table displays results showing that the mean excess return of every top-
minus-bottom portfolio is negative ranging from -0.74 % of the economic category to -
0.33 % of the environmental category. The mean excess return of the equally weighted 
top-minus-bottom portfolio is approximately -0.68 %. Among bottom portfolios, the en-
vironmental portfolio has the lowest mean excess return of 1.26 %. Compared to the top 
portfolios it is still higher than the highest mean excess return of 0.95 % which belongs 
to the governance aspect. Additionally, Table 4 reports that the standard deviations of 
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bottom portfolios are systematically higher than the standard deviations of top portfolios. 
Furthermore, minimum and maximum returns of the bottom portfolios are more radical 
than the corresponding returns of the top portfolios. Peculiarly, maximum values for the 
top portfolios are varying between 12.52 % and 17.00 % while the maximum excess re-
turns of the bottom portfolios range from 20.50 % to 27.44 %. Both of the lowest maxi-
mum observations are yielded by the EW portfolio. In conclusion, the summary statistics 
of the table suggest that the SRI performs poorly during the sample period and may indi-
cate that the first hypothesis of the thesis cannot be confirmed. 
 
Following the portfolio construction, the alphas of each portfolio are calculated by em-
ploying Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model in a similar manner as Bansal et al. (2018). 
The final model for the alpha estimation is fitted in the OLS regression equation below: 
 
(3.) 𝑟𝑐,𝑑,𝑡 −𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑐,𝑑 + 𝛽𝑐,𝑑
(𝑅𝑀−𝑅𝑓)(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑐,𝑑
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵+ 𝛽𝑐,𝑑
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿+ 𝛽𝑐,𝑑
𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐿+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑑,𝑡 
 
where rc,d,t is the decile portfolio (top, bottom or top-minus-bottom) of responsibility cat-
egory c during the month t and Rf is the 1-month T-Bill return used as a risk-free interest 
rate. Additionally, RM - Rf, SMB, HML, and WML are the corresponding four factors of 
Carhart’s four-factor model gathered from the data library of Kenneth French (2019). 
 
Estimated alphas are investigated in more detail. In particular, the alpha of the equally 
weighted top-minus-bottom portfolio is examined in various ways. First, the overall time 
variability of the EW portfolio alpha is under consideration to detect the possible wealth 
dependent preference shifts of SR investors. As Bansal et al. (2018) the 36-month rolling 
regression is utilized to detect the overall time variability and the evaluation is imple-
mented by describing the variability of 36-month rolling alpha. Secondly, the time varia-
bility and the wealth dependence of SRI are examined by dividing the sample into three 
periods by utilizing the recession period from December 2007 to June 2009 reported by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER 2020). The three different periods 
under the evaluation are the pre-recession period from January 2003 to November 2007, 
the NBER recession period and the post-recession period from July 2009 to the end of 
December 2018. The main regression equation of the thesis is then estimated separately 
for each subperiod to detect if SRI returns reflect wealth dependence preference shifts 
and if the variability is observable between the periods. Finally, the luxury-good-like be-
havior of SRI is investigated by comparing the rolling alpha of the EW portfolio with the 
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36-month rolling average of U.S. PCE of jewelry and watches obtained from the database 
of Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the thesis are provided and analyzed. The esti-
mated alphas are the key interest of the thesis and in this chapter, the thesis attempts to 
offer evidence on behalf or against the hypotheses of the thesis. First, subchapter 6.1 dis-
plays the regression results considering the whole sample period from 2003 to 2018 and 
seeks to clarify the overall performance of the SRI based ASSET4 ESG portfolios. The 
ultimate objective is to solve if the significant outperformance of SRI exists. Subchapter 
6.2 aims to examine the second hypothesis and investigates the time variability of the 
alpha. In addition, the alpha is analyzed during different economical time periods to detect 
if the magnitude of the alpha is dependent on prevailing market conditions and if the 
wealth dependence is observable. Finally, subchapter 6.3 focuses on the possible luxury-
good-like behavior of the equally weighted ASSET4 ESG portfolio and tries to analyze 
if SRI is a luxury good of investors. 
 
 
6.1. The alpha in general 
 
This chapter targets to clarify the overall performance of SRI during the whole sample 
period. For that purpose, the thesis employs the modified Carhart’s four-factor model 
introduced in section 5 above. The methodology to estimate the alphas of each ASSET4 
ESG portfolios is similar with the paper of Bansal et al. (2018). Table 5 below offers 
regressed alphas for top, bottom and top-minus-bottom portfolios of each of the five cat-
egories. Furthermore, the estimated betas of market, size, value and momentum factors 
are offered for each portfolio. Overall, 15 portfolios are evaluated for all of which the 
four-factor alphas can be viewed from the table. In addition, the factor betas of each port-
folio are displayed by the table. The key interest is on the performance of the equally 
weighted top-minus-bottom (EW Top-Bot) portfolio since it indicates the returns of wide 
SRI based portfolio during the sample period. The performance of the EW Top-Bot port-
folio provides the most solid evidence to detect if the first hypothesis of the thesis can or 
cannot be rejected.  
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Table 5. Portfolio alphas and betas for different categories.  
The table displays the OLS regression results estimated by the equation 3 for the whole sample period from 
January 2003 to December 2018 including total of 192 monthly observations for each portfolio. The table 
presents the four-factor alphas and the factor loadings for the top, bottom and top-minus-bottom portfolios 
of each category. “Top” (“Bot”) indicate the portfolios including the best (worst) 10 % of companies in a 
certain category. “Top-Bot” signify the long-short portfolio buying the best and selling the worst companies. 
“RM - Rf”, “SMB”, “HML” and “WML” are the corresponding four factors of Carhart’s four factor model. Nota-
tions *, ** and *** represent the statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. P-values 
are in parentheses below the estimated results and “R2” represents the goodness of fit. 
 
  Alpha RM - Rf SMB HML WML R2 
Environment Top 0.0016* 1.0600*** -0.0883** 0.0347 -0.0100*** 0.94 
 (0.051) (0.000) (0.019) (0.336) (0.000)  
Environment Bot 0.0054*** 0.9550*** 0.1045*** 0.2375* -0.1495*** 0.89 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000)  
Environment Top-Bot -0.0038*** 0.1050** -0.1928*** -0.2028*** 0.0496 0.12 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.177)  
Social Top 0.0013 0.9676*** -0.1127*** -0.1049*** -0.1134*** 0.92 
 (0.127) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)  
Social Bot 0.0062*** 0.9993*** 0.2256*** -0.0231 -0.2140*** 0.86 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.698) (0.000)  
Social Top-bot -0.0049*** -0.0316 -0.3383*** -0.0818 0.1006*** 0.23 
 (0.001) (0.446) (0.000) (0.209) (0.008)  
Governance Top 0.0023** 0.9898*** -0.0297 -0.0280 -0.0857*** 0.91 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.487) (0.497) (0.000)  
Governance Bot 0.0059*** 1.0598*** 0.2229*** -0.0538 -0.1549*** 0.90 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.301) (0.000)  
Governance Top-Bot -0.0036** -0.0700* -0.2525*** 0.0258 0.0692* 0.16 
 (0.012) (0.082) (0.000) (0.681) (0.055)  
Economic Top 0.0015* 0.9569*** 0.0318 -0.0025 -0.0568*** 0.93 
 (0.057) (0.000) (0.382) (0.944) (0.005)  
Economic Bot 0.0073*** 1.1101*** 0.3232*** 0.0986 -0.1895*** 0.87 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.1369) (0.000)  
Economic Top-Bot -0.0058*** -0.1531*** -0.2914*** -0.1011 0.1328*** 0.29 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.172) (0.002)  
EW Top 0.0025*** 0.9288*** -0.0829** -0.0960*** -0.0740*** 0.93 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.021) (0.006) (0.000)  
EW Bot 0.0080*** 1.0181*** 0.3158*** -0.0793 -0.1266*** 0.88 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000)  
EW Top-Bot -0.0055*** -0.0893** -0.3987*** -0.0167 0.0526 0.27 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.793) (0.149)  
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Considering the results of Table 5 the most intriguing fact is that all equally weighted 
portfolios produce statistically significant alphas. The EW Top portfolio yields signifi-
cantly positive alpha of 0.25 % per month, which is not surprising as also many previous 
papers, including Bansal et al. (2018), have reported positive alphas for the top portfolio. 
The major finding of the table is that the EW Bot portfolio also yields a significantly 
positive alpha of 0.80 % per month which is more than three times the amount of the 
alpha of the EW Top portfolio. Thereby the estimated alpha of the EW Top-Bot portfolio 
is -0.55% per month which means that the annual alpha is approximately -6.4 % and the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 % level. In other words, the evidence sug-
gests that overall the worst ASSET4 ESG rated companies of the S&P 500 index signifi-
cantly outperform the most responsible companies. Based on the factor loadings, the mar-
ket (RM - Rf) and size (SMB) factors are important explanatory variables behind the ex-
pected returns of the EW Top-Bot portfolio. Additionally, the findings indicate that the 
difference between the equally weighted top and bottom portfolio is that the bottom port-
folio is significantly tilted toward small companies. Summarized, it may indicate that 
small companies with low overall ASSET4 ESG scores tend to outperform big companies 
with high scores.  
 
Further, Table 5 shows that a similar pattern exists within every individual ASSET4 ESG 
category. All top-minus-bottom portfolios display statistically significant but negative re-
sults when the whole sample period from January 2003 to December 2018 is evaluated. 
The alpha is varying from -0.58 % to -0.36 % per month, the lowest alpha is received by 
the economic top-minus-bottom portfolio and the highest with the governance Top-Bot 
portfolio. The negative alphas of individual Top-Bot portfolios are driven by the highly 
positive alphas of the bottom portfolios, which are all statistically significant at the 1 % 
level. Similarly, with the equally weighted portfolio, the four-factor betas indicate that 
individual bottom portfolios are consistently tilted toward small companies. Additionally, 
the momentum (WML) factor displays negative and significant loading with all top and 
bottom portfolios. Instead, the value (HML) factor is only significant with the environ-
mental bottom portfolio suggesting that the portfolio holds small growth stocks. Also, the 
market factor is significant with all top and bottom portfolios as expected.  
 
In conclusion, the findings of Table 5 strongly indicate that the first hypothesis: “SRI 
portfolio generates significant positive alpha”, can be rejected. The constructed SRI based 
long-short portfolios are constantly yielding statistically significant but negative alphas. 
The evidence suggests that the positive and significant alpha cannot be achieved by an 
equally weighted SRI portfolio or investing based on the ratings of a certain responsibility 
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dimension. These findings support the “doing good but not well” hypothesis and are con-
sistent with the idea that investors may have to pay a price for being responsible. The 
evidence is also against the findings of Bansal et al. (2018) as their paper suggests that 
certain SRI based portfolios generate significant positive returns. Next, the thesis evalu-
ates the time variability of the alphas. The more profound analysis is relevant and offers 
interesting contributions as in general, the derived alphas are negative and significant. 
 
 
6.2. The time variability of the alpha 
 
To detect the possible time variability of the alpha and to approach the second hypothesis 
of the thesis, the equally weighted portfolio alphas are regressed by the 36-month rolling 
regression. The regression is implemented similarly with Bansal et al. (2018). The rolling 
regression alpha is regressed from the portfolio returns using the period between month t 
and month t-36. Hence the time window of the rolling regression is 36 months and the 
step size is one month. The derived alphas of the 36-month rolling regression for equally 
weighted top, bottom, and top-minus-bottom portfolios are displayed below in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. 36-month rolling alphas of equally weighted top, bottom and top-minus-bottom 
portfolios. 
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Considering the line graphs of Figure 7 by visual evaluation it is evident that the alphas 
are not steady nor consistent over time. Instead, the alphas are varying considerably over 
time. Specifically, the figure displays that first approximately during the period of De-
cember 2005 to September 2011 the regressed alpha of EW Top-Bot portfolio exhibit 
more turbulent variation. Additionally, from October 2011 to July 2015 the EW Top 
seems to offer the lowest alphas leading to the poor performance of the EW Top-Bot 
portfolio. At the end of the period, approximately after July 2015, the EW top portfolio 
is improving while the EW bottom portfolio, on the other hand, is declining. Naturally, 
during that period EW Top-Bot is also improving. To highlight the time variability of SRI 
based portfolios also the top-minus-bottom portfolios of individual ASSET4 ESG cate-
gories are presented in Figure 8 below. The alphas presented in the figure are regressed 
similarly by the 36-month rolling regression. 
 
Figure 8. Rolling alphas of individual ASSET4 ESG Top-Bot portfolios. 
 
 
Analyzing Figure 8 it can be stated that none of the individual ESG portfolios display 
steady path over the sample period but instead, all portfolio alphas are experiencing 
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turbulent variation during the years in question. The time variability is even more pro-
nounced with environmentally and socially friendly portfolios than with more traditional 
ESG aspects focusing on governance and economic issues. Thereby, based on the visual 
evaluation of Figures 7 and 8 the second hypothesis: “The alpha of SRI portfolio is time-
varying”, cannot be rejected. To proceed and at the same time to evaluate the third hy-
pothesis the sample period from January 2003 to December 2018 is divided into three 
different subperiods. The periods are the NBER recession period from December 2007 to 
June 2009 used as a proxy for economically bad times, and the periods before and after 
the recession, in other words, the good economic times. The different periods are exam-
ined by regressing the alphas of ASSET4 ESG top-minus-bottom portfolios to detect if 
the performance of SRI can be explained by the wealth dependence preferences of inves-
tors. The evaluation of different periods offers evidence to clarify if the second and third 
hypothesis of the thesis can be rejected. Table 6 below shows the four-factor alphas of 
top-minus-bottom portfolios during these different periods. The alphas are regressed by 
the simple OLS regression. 
 
 
Table 6. Portfolio alphas during different time periods. 
The table displays the OLS regression results estimated by the equation 3 for three different time periods. 
Panel A presents the results for the period before the NBER recession from January 2003 to November 
2007, Panel B during the NBER recession period from December 2007 to June 2009 and Panel C after the 
NBER recession from July 2009 to December 2018. The coefficients reported are the four-factor alphas and 
factor loadings of top-minus-bottom (Top-Bot) portfolios of different ASSET4 ESG categories. Each top-
minus-bottom portfolio is constructed by buying the best and selling the worst 10 % of companies of a certain 
category. “RM - Rf”, “SMB”, “HML” and “WML” are the corresponding four factors of Carhart’s four factor 
model. Notations *, ** and *** represent the statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respec-
tively. P-values are in parentheses below the estimated results, “R2” represents the goodness of fit and “N.” 
represents the number of monthly observations. 
 
Panel A: Before the NBER recession           
Alpha RM - Rf SMB HML WML R2 N. 
Environment 0.0018 -0.2006* -0.0645 -0.3980** 0.0130 0.20 59 
 (0.484) (0.077) (0.623) (0.012) (0.879)   
Social -0.0008 -0.2222** -0.2448* -0.1889 0.0432 0.28 59 
 (0.749) (0.040) (0.053) (0.198) (0.594)   
Governance 0.0013 -0.2211** -0.2135 -0.0931 -0.1326 0.25 59 
 (0.599) (0.049) (0.104) (0.539) (0.120)   
Economic 0.0002 -0.5884*** -0.1267 -0.1979 0.1229 0.48 59 
 (0.950) (0.000) (0.383) (0.245) (0.195)   
Equally weighted -0.0033 -0.2948** -0.3579*** -0.1099 -0.0966 0.38 59 
 (0.220) (0.012) (0.010) (0.484) (0.271)   
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Panel B: During the NBER recession           
Alpha RM - Rf SMB HML WML R2 N. 
Environment 0.0007 0.1960 -0.1940 -0.5262*** 0.1131 0.54 19 
 (0.928) (0.164) (0.569) (0.009) (0.222)   
Social 0.0032 0.1921 -0.8916** -0.1412 0.2422** 0.51 19 
 (0.760) (0.285) (0.058) (0.541) (0.053)   
Governance -0.0045 0.0887 -0.1831 -0.0433 0.2337*** 0.54 19 
 (0.522) (0.457) (0.537) (0.779) (0.009)   
Economic -0.0017 0.1515 -0.4569 -0.2803 0.2833** 0.63 19 
 (0.849) (0.320) (0.233) (0.166) (0.012)   
Equally weighted 0.0009 -0.0162 -0.7026* 0.0276 0.1606 0.49 19 
 (0.915) (0.915) (0.078) (0.889) (0.125)   
Panel C: After the NBER recession             
Alpha RM - Rf SMB HML WML R2 N. 
Environment -0.0065*** 0.2003*** -0.2342*** -0.0385 -0.0562 0.20 114 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.593) (0.299)   
Social -0.0055*** -0.0296 -0.2607*** -0.0895 -0.0752 0.17 114 
 (0.001) (0.511) (0.000) (0.227) (0.176)   
Governance -0.0039** -0.0846* -0.2081*** 0.0484 -0.0477 0.13 114 
 (0.027) (0.085) (0.007) (0.546) (0.428)   
Economic -0.0059*** -0.1531*** -0.2386*** -0.0895 -0.0349 0.20 114 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.334) (0.615)   
Equally weighted -0.0062*** -0.0311 -0.3353*** -0.0324 -0.0488 0.21 114 
 (0.000) (0.506) (0.000) (0.673) (0.397)   
 
 
First, the results of the period before the recession, which are offered in Panel A of Table 
6. Most importantly the panel displays that all ASSET4 ESG alphas appear insignificant 
during the period. Considering the portfolios of individual categories, the alphas are in-
consistent, and the p-values are certainly high to make any solid conclusions. Continuing 
the analysis, the equally weighted Top-Bot portfolio displays a negative alpha of -0.33 % 
per month, but the result is also insignificant. The market and size factors are driving the 
performance of the EW portfolio and the market factor is the most significant driver be-
hind other long-short portfolios. Additionally, the performance of the environmental Top-
Bot portfolio is significantly driven by the value factor and the size factor of the social 
portfolio is significant at the 10 % level. Overall, the conclusion is that during the time 
period before the recession the equally weighted SRI alpha is negative, but statistically 
significant returns are not displayed.  
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Similar results regarding the alphas are found by examining the recession period in Panel 
B. None of the regressed alphas are significant. In contrast to the earlier period, the market 
factor appears insignificant with all of the portfolios and the loading of momentum factor 
is significant with social, governance and economic categories. The size factor is only 
mildly significant considering the EW portfolio and significant at the 5 % level with the 
social aspect. The HML beta of the environmental portfolio remains highly significant 
and negative. The alpha of the equally weighted portfolio is positive, but the p-value is 
very high to make any further interpretations. Again, noteworthy conclusions cannot be 
made, and the evidence supports the “no effect” hypothesis during the recession period. 
In other words, the thesis cannot find any additional benefits that can be obtained via 
high-quality CSR actions during the recession. Consequently, the thesis suggests that SRI 
does not over- or underperform during the recession.  
 
Finally, the results during the post-recession era, presented in Panel C, show statistically 
significant results regarding the alpha. In fact, the top-minus-bottom portfolio of the gov-
ernance category is the only one to yield significant alpha at the 5 % level while the other 
portfolios yield statistically significant alphas at the 1 % level. All alphas are negative 
varying from -0.65 % to -0.39 %. The results of Panel C indicate that the post-recession 
era drives also the results of the whole sample period presented in subchapter 6.1. The 
equally weighted Top-Bot portfolio gains an alpha of -0.62 % per month and the expected 
return of the portfolio is largely driven by the highly significant size factor. Other factor 
loadings regarding the equally weighted portfolio are insignificant. Generally, during the 
post-recession period, the market and size factors are the main drivers behind the perfor-
mance of individual ASSET4 ESG portfolios, the value and momentum factors appear 
constantly insignificant. Based on the findings, investors are paying additional costs by 
employing SRI during the economically good period after the recession. 
 
Concluded, the results of Table 6 offer evidence to endorse the second hypothesis as the 
performance of the portfolios are indeed varying over time. First, the performance is in-
significant but after the NBER recession period, all of the portfolios are generating sig-
nificantly negative returns. Based on the results of Figures 7 and 8, and the results of 
Table 6 the hypothesis: “The alpha of SRI portfolio is time-varying” cannot be rejected. 
On the other hand, based on the evidence provided in Table 6 the H3: “The SRI alpha is 
significantly positive only during good economic periods” may be rejected. There is no 
evidence to support the third hypothesis and in fact, empirical findings of the thesis mostly 
indicate the opposite results suggesting that the alphas of SRI based portfolios are nega-
tive during good times. More precisely one may indicate that SRI is a poor strategy during 
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good economic times as the post-recession era yields highly significant and negative re-
turns while also the pre-recession period generates insignificant but still a negative alpha. 
The evidence is in line with the findings of Bansal et al. (2018) regarding the overall time 
variability, but the nature of the variability differs radically as Bansal et al. (2018) state 
that SRI performs significantly better during good times. This thesis cannot find any ev-
idence suggesting a similar pattern where the alpha is higher during good economic times 
and lower during bad times. 
 
The insignificant alpha of the first two periods may indicate that the market participants 
learned to price the information of ESG aspects correctly. The first two periods cover 
approximately the same era during which Borgers et al (2013) and Bebchuk et al (2013) 
implemented their studies. Consequently, the learning hypothesis of Borgers et al. (2013) 
and Bebchuk et al (2013) is supported by the results of Panel A and B. Interpreting the 
negative and significant alpha of the post-recession period is more complex and partly 
beyond the scope of this thesis. One explanation could be that the recent financial crisis 
significantly changed the overall responsibility environment. If this is the case, then the 
high standards of ESG may be harder and more costly to achieve during the period after 
the recession when the role of regulation and trust has been pronounced by the crisis.  
 
Considering also the insignificant but negative alpha during the pre-recession period an-
other possible explanation could be plausible. It may be that the least responsible compa-
nies are paying a significant price during the recession and hence a rebound occurs when 
the market environment slowly reverts to the normal state after the crisis. If the least 
responsible firms are suffering stronger during the recession, then the recovery after may 
be pronounced. Even further one explanation could be that during the recession or crisis 
the benefit of being responsible is prominent but after the bad time advantages fade away. 
These explanations might be possible especially if the findings of the hedging effect of 
SRI by Lins et al. (2017) and Leite & Cortez (2015) are correct. The results of the thesis 
regarding the performance are mainly consistent with the evidence of Leite & Cortez 
(2015) as authors state that during crisis SR investors achieve the same level of returns 
and during non-crisis periods, they may have to pay a price for being responsible. 
 
Next, the thesis examines the relation between luxury goods consumption and SRI. Based 
on the findings of Table 6 it can be indicated that also the fourth hypothesis relating the 
luxury-good-like behavior of SRI cannot be confirmed. It is reasonable to assume that 
because if SRI and luxury goods consumption are highly correlated then SRI should 
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produce positive returns during good economic times and significantly negative results 
during the recession. The empirical comparison is offered in the subchapter below. 
 
 
6.3. The SRI and luxury goods 
 
To evaluate the luxury-good-like behavior the thesis utilizes the personal consumption 
expenditures on jewelry and watches of the United States obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). The co-movement analysis is employed similarly as in the 
paper of Bansal et al. (2018) in which authors use the growth rate of PCE on jewelry and 
watches to detect if a notable correlation exists between the luxury goods consumption 
and the alpha of long-short SRI portfolio. In this subchapter, the thesis evaluates if the 
36-month rolling alpha of equally weighted ASSET4 ESG portfolio correlates with the 
growth of U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches. Figure 9 below shows the line graphs of the 
36-month rolling regressed alpha of the equally weighted top-minus-bottom portfolio and 
the 36-month rolling average growth rate of U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches. The period 
in the figure begins in December 2005 and lasts until November 2018, as 36-month rolling 
values are displayed and the original sample is from January 2003 to December 2018. 
 
 
Figure 9. Correlation between the rolling alpha of EW Top-Bot portfolio and rolling av-
erage growth of U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches. 
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Exploring the results of Figure 9 it is obvious that the correlation is not high between the 
two presented variables, and that the 36-month rolling alpha of the EW portfolio is not 
progressing synchronized with the growth of luxury goods consumption. In fact, the fig-
ure suggests somewhat opposite relation and the correlation appears to be extremely low 
and even significantly negative during certain periods. The overall correlation during the 
whole sample period is approximately -0.31 as reported by the figure. A closer look at 
the figure shows that near November 2008 during the financial crisis the growth of luxury 
goods consumption drops distinctly, a similar drop is not present with the rolling alpha. 
Instead, during the period from November 2008 to the beginning of 2010, the alpha dis-
plays an increasing trend, even though it remains negative all the time. Additionally, for 
example from the beginning of the year 2011 from where the trend of PCE on jewelry 
and watches is significantly increasing the alpha of the EW ASSET4 ESG portfolio is 
decreasing instead. Especially the correlation is negative during the year 2011 when the 
U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches seemingly recovers after the recession, while the rolling 
alpha of the EW portfolio decreases radically. During the later period from 2013 to 2017 
overall trends appear to be negative as alpha is increasing and luxury goods consumption 
is moderately decreasing. In general, there is no evidence suggesting that a significant 
positive correlation exists between the two data series.  
 
As can be observed from Figure 9 the correlation clearly variates during the whole sample 
period. To clarify if economic conditions have an impact on the correlation the thesis 
reports pre-recession, recession and post-recession correlation in Table 7 below. In addi-
tion, the thesis considers that the most important times regarding the fourth hypothesis of 
the thesis are the periods of dramatic decrease of U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches from 
June 2008 to December 2011 and the recovery period of luxury goods consumption from 
August 2010 to December 2011. Both periods are distinct by studying Figure 9 and the 
correlation during these periods appears to be negative by visual evaluation. This thesis 
states that positive correlation should exist during these periods to support the fourth hy-
pothesis regarding the luxury-good-like behavior of SRI. Therefore, Table 7 below re-
ports also the correlation of both key periods mentioned above. 
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Table 7. Correlations between the rolling alpha of EW Top-Bot portfolio and U.S. PCE 
on jewelry and watches during subperiods 
 
Period Correlation coefficient 
Before the NBER recession from December 2005 to November 2007 0.6213 
During the NBER recession from December 2007 to June 2009 -0.4347 
After the NBER recession from July 2009 to November 2018 -0.5484 
From June 2008 to December 2008 -0.4636 
From August 2010 to December 2011 -0.5756 
 
 
As the table displays the correlation is notably higher during the pre-recession period 
comparing to the overall negative correlation of the whole sample period reported in Fig-
ure 9. One may indicate that as the correlation is approximately 0.62 during the good time 
before the recession SRI can be viewed as a luxury good of investors during that period. 
However, when considering all other subperiods the correlation is significantly negative, 
and the possible luxury-good-like behavior of SRI cannot be detected. To be specific the 
correlations during the recession and post-recession periods are even lower than the over-
all correlation being approximately -0.43 and -0.55, respectively. Additionally, the corre-
lations during both observed key periods are significantly negative and lower than the 
overall correlation by being approximately -0.46 during the dramatic decrease of U.S. 
PCE on jewelry and watches from June 2008 to December 2008 and -0.58 during the 
distinct recovery period from August 2010 to December 2011.  
 
To conclude the relation between luxury goods consumption and SRI this thesis suggests 
that based on the evidence congruent relation does not exist. It is possible that before the 
recession and recent financial crisis the highly positive correlation indicates the luxury-
good-like behavior of SRI during that period. Still, any solid conclusions cannot be made 
based on such a sort subperiod and overall the thesis states that as other periods display 
negative correlation it is more likely that a sort of negative correlation exists. Especially 
as also the correlation during detected key periods appear strongly negative this thesis 
states that the movement can be following somewhat reversing pattern meaning that when 
one goes up the other decreases and vice versa. 
 
In summary, Bansal et al. (2018) find that the alpha of the SRI long-short portfolio is 
mildly positive in general but significantly time-varying. According to Bansal et al. 
(2018), the alpha is significantly positive during good economic times and on the other 
hand, the outperformance is not significant during bad times. Consequently, Bansal et al. 
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(2018) find that SRI is a wealth dependent investing strategy, which results in a high 
correlation between luxury goods consumption and SRI returns. Bansal et al. (2018) pro-
pose that SRI is wealth dependent as investors can afford to be responsible only during 
good times when the aggregate wealth is at a high level. Inspired by the paper of Bansal 
et al. (2018) the fourth hypothesis of this thesis is: “The SRI alpha correlates with luxury 
goods consumption”. Since, this thesis cannot find any robust evidence to support the 
findings of Bansal et al. (2018) regarding the luxury-good-like behavior and the evidence 
rather display reverse dependence, the fourth hypothesis of the thesis must be rejected.  
 
Overall, the empirical part of the thesis shows that the first, third and fourth hypothesis 
can be rejected while the second hypothesis cannot be rejected. First, the evidence sug-
gests that socially responsible portfolios based on ASSET4 ESG ratings, buying the most 
responsible companies and selling the least responsible ones, cannot achieve significantly 
positive alphas. Excess returns cannot be reached by utilizing neither the individual ESG 
aspects nor the equally weighted ratings. In contrast, when considering the whole sample 
from January 2003 to December 2018, all of the long-short portfolios are surprisingly 
yielding statistically significant and negative returns. Secondly, the findings derived by 
investigating the 36-month rolling regressions and three subperiods support the time var-
iability hypothesis and the second hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thirdly, the results of 
the thesis do not display any wealth dependent behavior of the alpha but rather shows that 
SRI produce significantly negative returns during the latest good economic time period. 
Finally, the luxury-good-like behavior of SRI is not present when considering the ex-
plored sample period. Instead, the evidence suggests negative correlation indicating that 
SRI is not a luxury good of investors. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis by revisiting the purpose of the study and the hypothesis 
stated in the introduction. Further, the findings are discussed, and the limitations of the 
thesis are noted. Finally, the section considers the practical importance of the findings 
and provides suggestions for the following research on the field of socially responsible 
investing.  
 
The thesis examines the performance of socially responsible investing (SRI) from a novel 
point of view inspired by the working paper of Bansal, Wu, and Yaron (2018). In general, 
previous literature finds mixed results regarding the performance of SRI. Plenty of papers 
support the “doing good while doing well” hypothesis while some evidence strongly con-
firms that “doing good but not well” and “no effect” hypothesis are also plausible options. 
Bansal et al. (2018) approach the issue with a new perspective by considering the time 
variability of the excess returns of SRI. The findings of Bansal et al. (2018) indicate that 
the SRI returns are significantly time-varying and the strategy yields significantly positive 
returns only during good economic times. Hence, the SRI follows the wealth dependent 
preferences of investors and the consumption of luxury goods correlates with the alpha 
of the SRI portfolio. In other words, Bansal et al. (2018) argue that investors view SRI as 
a luxury good and during good times when the overall wealth is at a high level, they can 
afford to be SRI-conscious. 
 
To investigate the returns of SRI, the time variability of the returns and the possible lux-
ury-good-like behavior the thesis determines four hypotheses:  
 
H1: SRI portfolio generates significant positive alpha 
 
H2: The alpha of SRI portfolio is time-varying 
 
H3: The SRI alpha is significantly positive only during good economic periods 
 
H4: The SRI alpha correlates with luxury goods consumption 
 
Before any empirical analysis, the thesis discovers that the idea of Bansal et al. (2018) is 
reasonable and based on the previous literature some similarities between socially respon-
sible investing and luxury goods consumption are found. For example, both SR investors 
and luxury consumers are often motivated by personal aspirations and the decision-
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making process is not purely rational. In addition, based on the existing performance 
driven research the conclusions of Bansal et al. (2018) remain possible, even though the 
paper of Lins. et al. (2017) among others offers somewhat contrary evidence by support-
ing the hedging effect of SRI during the recent crisis. Overall, based on the previous re-
search all of the formed hypotheses are considered as plausible. 
 
Approaching the empirical investigation this thesis constructs 15 SRI portfolios based on 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG ratings of S&P 500 firms. ASSET4 provides annual 
firm-specific scores of environmental, social, governance and economic aspects, and the 
equally weighted score is based on the individual categories. The thesis employs a cut-
off rate of 10 %, accordingly top (bottom) portfolio includes the most (the least) respon-
sible companies. Also, the top-minus-bottom portfolios for each category are constructed. 
All portfolios are annually rebalanced, and the performance evaluation is executed by 
employing Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. 
 
First, the thesis examines the performance of the portfolios during the whole sample pe-
riod from January 2003 to December 2018 to detect if the formed SRI portfolios are yield-
ing excess returns and especially if these excess returns are positive. The thesis finds that 
all of the top-minus-bottom portfolios yield statistically significant and negative alphas 
mainly driven by the significant excess returns of the bottom portfolios. None of the top 
or bottom portfolios yield negative alpha. Based on the pure performance evaluation re-
garding the whole sample period the thesis rejects the first hypothesis and suggests that 
SRI cannot generate positive alpha instead the alpha is significantly negative. Although 
the first hypothesis can be rejected the evidence still offers a good ground to proceed as 
the rest of the hypotheses remain conceivable. 
 
The second hypothesis is tested by regressing the portfolio alphas by 36-month rolling 
regression similarly as Bansal et al. (2018) do in their research. The thesis finds that in-
deed SRI returns experience large time-varying patterns during the sample period and the 
second hypothesis cannot be rejected. In addition, the thesis divides the sample period by 
using the NBER recession period to examine three different time periods: pre-recession, 
recession and post-recession. The revealed evidence supports the conclusion that the sec-
ond hypothesis cannot be rejected. Interestingly, the thesis finds that SRI is not producing 
statistically significant abnormal returns during the pre-recession and the NBER recession 
periods. Further, the SRI is significantly underperforming during the economically good 
post-recession period. As the alpha of the equally weighted top-minus-bottom portfolio 
is only significant during the post-recession being -0.62 % per month the thesis rejects 
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the third hypothesis. The alpha is not positive during good economic times. In fact, the 
evidence indicates quite the opposite relation, even though the SRI returns are not statis-
tically significant before and during the crisis. Consequently, partially insignificant find-
ings imply that SRI may perform better during bad economic times when compared to 
normal or good times. Considering the results, the thesis offers slight support to the find-
ings of Lins et al. (2017), who declare the hedging effect of SRI during the recent financial 
crisis period. Mostly the evidence suggests that SR investors are able to match the per-
formance of conventional investors during bad times while they may have to pay a price 
for being responsible during good times. Hence the evidence is mostly in line with the 
paper of Leite & Cortez (2015). 
 
Also, the fourth hypothesis regarding the relation between SRI and luxury goods is re-
jected based on the derived results. The thesis compares the 36-month rolling alpha of the 
equally weighted top-minus-bottom portfolio to the 36-month rolling average growth rate 
of the U.S. PCE on jewelry and watches, and overall moderate negative correlation of -
0.31 is found. The sample is also divided into five subperiods to detect if any positive 
relation exists. The positive correlation appears only during the period before the reces-
sion indicating that SRI may behave like a luxury good of investors during that period. 
However as other subperiods and the whole sample period indicate notable negative cor-
relation and the pre-recession sample is relatively short the thesis cannot conclude any 
significant positive co-movement between the two variables. Overall, similar wealth de-
pendent preference shifts or correlation with the paper of Bansal et al. (2018) cannot be 
detected and the findings are mainly in contrast to the earlier evidence of Bansal et al. 
(2018). 
 
In summary, considering the paper of Bansal et al. (2018) the thesis finds evidence to 
support the time variability hypothesis, even though the pattern is not similar, and the SRI 
returns are not following corresponding wealth dependent preferences. Instead, the thesis 
display evidence suggesting that SRI is yielding negative abnormal returns during the 
whole sample period and that these negative returns are mainly driven by the weak per-
formance during the economically good post-recession period. During pre-recession and 
recession periods derived alpha is not statistically significant. Accordingly, the thesis pro-
vides weak evidence to support the learning hypothesis of Borgers et al. (2013) and Beb-
chuk et al. (2013) as it seems that abnormal returns do not exist before and during the 
recession. A turn occurs after the recession as SRI starts to yield statistically negative 
returns. During the post-recession period the high negative performance might be driven 
by various reasons, one potential source can be the sluggish rebound of the least 
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responsible companies. It can be that if the least responsible companies are punished dur-
ing a crisis, they are gaining abnormal returns after the recession when the overall trust 
and economic activities slowly revert towards the normal level. Another possibility could 
be that the benefit of being responsible is pronounced only in the unstable market envi-
ronment during and straight after the recent financial crisis. Further, when the market 
stability is revived, and overall conditions are normalized the additional trust towards 
highly responsible companies disappears resulting in highly negative SRI returns during 
the post-recession period. These alternatives may be possible especially if the hedging 
effect of SRI demonstrated for example by Lins et al. (2017) and Leite & Cortez (2015) 
is robust. Finding and confirming the exact source of the significantly negative post-re-
cession returns is still beyond the scope of this thesis and remains open for future research.  
 
While the results of the thesis partially display high statistical significance and are mostly 
in contrast to the findings of Bansal et al. (2018) several limitations exist. First, the port-
folio construction is made based on the data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 consisting 
of the 500 companies that were listed in the S&P 500 index in 2019. Ideally, the invest-
ment universe should not be that limited but due to data availability, the decision to use 
these 500 firms is made. Secondly, the thesis does not take portfolio re-allocation costs 
for example transaction fees into account. Thirdly, the thesis blindly utilizes the ASSET4 
ESG scores and the validity of the scores is not examined carefully before the portfolio 
construction. Additionally, the industry weighting of ASSET4 ESG portfolios is not eval-
uated in the thesis. Albeit the limitations lower the value of the findings at the same time 
these issues provide a premise for future examination.  
 
For future research, the same sample period could be examined in various ways. This 
thesis does not consider for example the best in class method that could offer additional 
value for the conclusions. Furthermore, the portfolio formation could be performed by 
considering the ratings of various ESG data providers to offer a better foundation for 
portfolio construction. Also, a wider set of companies could be used for example the 
companies of Russel 3000 index. When considering the wealth dependent preferences 
and luxury-good-like behavior of SRI there are various possibilities. One option could be 
to investigate the time variability with the longer sample period by including more than 
one NBER recession period into the sample. Another opening could be to examine addi-
tional economic indicators to separate good and bad economic times. In addition, the re-
lation between luxury goods and SRI could be re-examined by utilizing the co-movement 
and causality test such as the Granger causality test. As a final suggestion, one intriguing 
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opportunity offered by the thesis is to further investigate the reasons behind the pro-
nounced negative performance of SRI during the post-recession era. 
 
Concluded the thesis finds that the SRI returns are time-varying, before and during the 
latest recession SRI does not provide abnormal returns but after the recession, the returns 
are significantly negative. Any reasonable wealth dependence cannot be confirmed and 
the positive correlation between the SRI and luxury goods is not found. From a practical 
point of view if the negative performance of SRI after the recession is due to a possible 
rebound of the least responsible stocks then practitioners should avoid SR investing after 
the recession. On the other hand, if the pronounced importance of social responsibility 
arises during bad economic periods then investors may want to tilt their portfolios towards 
SRI during these times. Confirming the reason for negative post-recession returns remains 
open for future research. Considering the whole sample period socially responsible in-
vesting underperforms indicating that practitioners should be aware that being responsible 
might be costly. 
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